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The euro – what's in it for me? 
An Economic Analysis of the Swedish Euro Referendum of 2003 
 




Abstract: The Swedish referendum on the euro in September 2003 is an exceptional event for 
researchers of monetary unions and of European economic integration. Voters chose between 
maintaining the domestic currency, the krona, and replacing it with the euro, the single 
currency of the European Union. The referendum revealed significant dividing lines between 
Yes- and No-voters in areas such as income, education, sex, employment, geographical 
location and industrial structure.  
 
The aim of this study is to explain the large differences in voting behaviour. The empirical 
analysis of the referendum outcome is based on the traditional optimum currency area (OCA) 
approach, merged with an account of the distributional effects of Swedish membership of the 
euro area as they were perceived by the voters. The OCA approach builds upon the trade-off 
between reducing transaction costs by entering a monetary union, thus increasing trade and 
income, and obtaining macroeconomic insurance by having a domestic currency with a 
flexible exchange rate. This trade-off was perceived differently by voters depending on their 
evaluations of the costs or risks and the benefits or gains of adopting the euro versus keeping 
the krona, the domestic currency.  
 
We use the OCA approach to generate a set of hypotheses concerning voting behaviour that 
are explored in our econometric tests based on exit polls covering more than 10,000 voters on 
the day of the euro referendum. Our econometric results suggest that the OCA approach has 
strong predictive power when explaining differences in voting behaviour across groups in 
society. In particular, we demonstrate that insurance considerations dominated the prospect of 
reduced transaction costs in the referendum. It did so in a systematic way across segments of 
society indicating that voters were capable of making rational comparisons of the costs and 
benefits of monetary unification. Voters asked themselves: The euro – what's in it for me? 
Then they voted accordingly. 
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On Sunday September 14
th 2003, voters in Sweden went to the polls to answer the question: 
“Do you think that Sweden should introduce the euro as its official currency?”
2 There were 
three options: “Yes”, “No” and a blank ballot. The voters decided whether to maintain the 
domestic currency, the krona, which was introduced as the official currency unit in 1873, 
when Sweden adopted the gold standard, or to replace it with the euro, the currency of twelve 
of the then fifteen Member States of the European Union, that had been introduced in 1999 
and that came into physical existence in January 2002.  
 
The Swedish euro referendum in September 2003 is a unique one in economic and political 
history. It is the first and so far the only referendum that has dealt with a clear-cut choice 
between a then freely floating exchange rate and a permanently and irrevocably fixed 
exchange rate as implied by full membership in the euro area, or more precisely in entering 
Stage Three of the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union). The voters thus made a choice 
between the two extremes of exchange rate regimes. 
 
This electoral choice was different from the one facing voters in any previous euro-related 
referendum in Europe. The No-option implied that Sweden should maintain its domestic 
currency, the krona, based on a floating exchange rate combined with the then inflation 
targeting policy pursued by the Riksbank, the Swedish central bank. The Riksbank, which 
gained independence from the executive authority in the 1990s, announced, on its own 
initiative in January 1993, a policy regime of inflation targeting. The Bank set a target of a 
two-percent annual rate of inflation within a band of plus/minus one percentage point to be 
valid from January 1995.  
 
The Yes-alternative implied that Sweden would eventually become a full member of the euro 
system by replacing the krona with the euro, at the earliest in 2005-2006. In this case, the 
                                                 
1 We have received constructive comments from Johan Barras, Roel Beetsma, Tom Berglund, Lars Calmfors, Oliver 
Dieckmann, Per Eckefeldt, Rickard Eriksson, Paul De Grauwe, Jan Fidrmuc, Klas Fregert, David Laidler, Yngve Lindh,  
Michael Neugart, Henrik Oscarsson and Juhana Vartiainen and from seminar participants at the Hong Kong Institute for 
Monetary Research, the 2007 Mölle conference and at the University of Leuven. Torbjörn Berglund and Per Näsman helped 
us to obtain the data used in our econometric work. Louise Ratford has polished our English. An earlier version of this report, 
which deepens the analysis of the euro referendum as discussed in Jonung (2004), was published by SIEPS, Stockholm in 
March 2007 as SIEPS report 2007:2. We are grateful to SEIPS for financial support.  
2 This translation is taken from the press release of the Government on December 12, 2002, officially announcing that the 
referendum would take place on 14
th September 2003.    4
price stability oriented policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) would replace the national 
inflation targeting policy of the Riksbank. 
 
Other countries have held referenda on the Maastricht Treaty and on membership of the EU. 
However, in these cases the adoption of the new currency, the euro, was one of a larger set of 
issues on which the voters had to decide upon. The Danish euro referendum in September 
2000 was an exception; there the choice was between adopting the euro or maintaining the 
fixed exchange rate between the euro and the Danish krone within ERM 2. Consequently, the 
Danish referendum did not represent a choice between a freely floating and an irrevocably 
fixed exchange rate as in Sweden. Although the outcome of the Danish referendum was a no 
to the euro, and thus the domestic currency unit was maintained, from a monetary policy point 
of view, Denmark has since the referendum behaved as if it were a member of the euro area. 
Seen from this perspective, the Danish referendum was more about choosing the name for the 
currency unit than choosing between two clearly different exchange rate arrangements, as was 
the case in the Swedish referendum.
 3  
 
The Swedish euro referendum was the culmination of a long public debate in which the pros 
and cons of monetary unification and of a national currency were thoroughly analyzed. The 
reports of two Government Commissions, one published in 1996 and the other in 2002, 
preceded the referendum, as well as a stream of books, pamphlets and articles, and a heated 
public debate in the media and all over Sweden.
4 
 
The Swedish economics profession took a very active part in the exchange of views, 
reflecting the tradition of the strong involvement of economists in public debate.
5 Foreign 
economists were involved as well.
6 Their articles were translated and they were interviewed 
in the media. Issues such as the theory of optimum currency areas, central bank independence, 
the proper balance between monetary and fiscal policies, and the Stability and Growth Pact of 
the EU became familiar to many voters. In short, the standard textbook arguments for and 
against membership of a monetary union were part of the messages of the two camps – 
                                                 
3 Still, the Danish exchange rate to the euro is not irrevocably fixed. Denmark has the option of changing it although 
domestic policy-makers regard this option as highly undesirable. At this point the Danish monetary system should to all 
intents and purposes be regarded as that of a currency board.  
4 See SOU 1996:158 and SOU 2002:16. 
5 See Carlson and Jonung (2006) on this tradition.  
6 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Philip Lane, Robert Mundell, Andrew Rose and Joseph Stiglitz, among others, gave their views on 
the krona and the euro in the Swedish media.    5
although weighted differently, extended, combined and blended with non-economic 
arguments in the campaign. 
 
This lively public debate ensured that voters were able to obtain information about the 
benefits and costs of, on one hand, maintaining a domestic or national currency and, on the 
other, entering a monetary union like the euro area. Thus, to a researcher of economics as well 
as of political science, the Swedish referendum represents a unique opportunity to examine 
the determinants of voters’ perceptions of the benefits and costs of two alternative monetary 
regimes: a regime based on a domestic currency with a freely floating exchange rate versus a 
regime founded on membership of a monetary union with a freely floating exchange rate 
towards the rest of the world. Presently, according to the majority view among economists, 
these two options are the only viable exchange rate arrangements in a financially integrated 
world. They represent the two corner solutions or the bipolar choice so prominent in recent 
literature on exchange rate regimes.
7 
 
The outcome of the Swedish euro referendum 2003 revealed major differences in voting 
behaviour within the electorate. Dividing lines emerged between high and low-income 
earners, between voters with a university education and those with a lower level of education, 
between men and women, between voters in the public and private sectors, between the 
employed and unemployed, between government employees and municipal employees, 
between voting districts in urban and rural areas, between voters in Southern and Northern 
Sweden, between left-wing and right-wing voters to take the most prominent patterns. Many 
of these differences came as a surprise to commentators and observers.  
  
The purpose of this study is to examine the outcome of the Swedish euro referendum using an 
economic approach. More specifically, we employ the theory of optimum currency area to 
explain differences in voting behaviour across groups in Swedish society. To our knowledge, 
this is a novel approach. So far, practically all analyses of the euro referendum have been 
carried out by political scientists, adopting a political science perspective.
8 As a consequence, 
economic incentives as a potential driver of voting behaviour have been neglected or even 
                                                 
7 See for example Fischer (2001). 
8 Under the guidance of Sören Holmberg and Henrik Oscarsson, a group of political scientists at Gothenburg University has 
presented an impressive number of studies on the euro referendum. See Holmberg and Oscarsson (2004a).   6
ignored in spite of the fact that the referendum concerned the choice of the exchange rate 
regime for Sweden, a truly economic issue.  
 
Our study is structured as follows. First, the election result is summarized. Then the views of 
the economics profession on the benefits and the costs of membership of a monetary union 
are briefly considered. Thereafter, the voting behaviour predicted by the political economy of 
exchange rate regimes, by the arguments of the Yes and No-camps, and by studies on the 
attitudes of the public towards the euro and European integration is described. Next, a set of 
econometric tests follows, based on data compiled through exit polls taken on the day of the 
euro referendum combined with municipal level data. The results from studies on the Swedish 
euro referendum, on other EU-related referenda and on public attitudes towards the euro and 
European integration are subsequently compared with our empirical results. The attitudes of 
the public towards the Swedish currency are considered in a broader context. Finally, a 
summary concludes.  
 
 
2. The outcome of the referendum  
 
The referendum attracted a large share of the eligible voters in Sweden: 82.6 per cent cast 
their votes, and a total of 5,843,788 voters participated. In ten municipalities the turnout was 
in the top range of 87.0-89.9 per cent. In some smaller districts it exceeded 93 per cent. The 
voters clearly viewed the choice of currency as an important issue.
9 
 
The No-alternative received a clear majority with 55.9 per cent of the votes. The Yes-vote 
comprised 42.0 per cent and approximately 2 per cent opted for a blank vote. A mere 0.1 per 
cent of the votes cast were declared invalid. The No-vote was greater than most observers had 
expected, although it had been predicted by the opinion polls. The result was immediately 
recognized as a resounding victory for the No-camp. The Government announced that the 
outcome was to be respected.
10  
                                                 
9 The referendum gained tragic attention through the murder of the Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, a strong supporter of a Yes 
to the euro, a few days before the election. In all probability, her death had no significant impact on the outcome of the 
referendum. 
 
10 The No-vote in the referendum put Sweden in a complicated political situation as it has no opt-out clause, in contrast to 
Denmark and the United Kingdom. A strict legal interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty means that Sweden must join the 
euro area as soon as all the necessary criteria of the Treaty are fulfilled by Sweden.    7
The referendum revealed clear divisions across groups of voters based on income, education, 
gender, sectors of employment and ideology. Another important division concerned 
geographical voting patterns. The Yes-vote was concentrated to two parts of Sweden: first, 
Stockholm, the capital, and the municipalities surrounding it, and second, Skåne, the 
southernmost province. The rest of Sweden, in particular Norrland, the northernmost part of 
Sweden, voted strongly against the euro and in favour of keeping the krona. In short, the 
further north and the further away from the capital, the stronger the No-vote.  
 
The municipality of Haparanda, the main town on the border with Finland in the far north, 
was one much publicized exception to this pattern. Here the outcome of the vote was a solid 
Yes. The voters of Haparanda were familiar with the euro as it was already in circulation in 
neighbouring Finland. Thus, many shops in Haparanda displayed their prices in both kronor 
and euro. The euro is accepted as a means of payment in most shops in Haparanda. It is 
generally held that this everyday contact with the euro contributed to the local Yes-majority. 
 
It is a challenge to explain these differences in voting behaviour in a consistent manner. The 
search for an explanation should therefore start from the long process leading up to the 
referendum. The referendum was preceded by two major official commission reports as well 
as many months of dissemination of information and campaigning. The arguments advanced 
in the public debate influenced the voters’ perceptions of the benefits and costs of joining a 
monetary union. We will now turn to these arguments. 
 
 
3. The economics profession on the euro  
 
Economists were involved in the debate about full Swedish membership of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) at a very early stage. A Government Commission Report, published 
in 1996 as SOU 1996:158, best known as the Calmfors Report, set the stage for the ensuing 
discussions, both within as well as outside the economics profession.
11 The Commission 
consisted of economists and political scientists. It was headed by Lars Calmfors, Professor of 
Economics at Stockholm University and at that time Chairman of the Economic Council of 
Sweden (Ekonomiska rådet), the scientific advisory body of the Ministry of Finance.  
                                                 
11 See SOU 1996:158 for the original Swedish report and Calmfors et al. (1997) for an English version.    8
 
In short, the economic analysis of the report was based on the traditional theory of optimum 
currency areas (OCA) listing the expected benefits and costs of full Swedish membership of 
the EMU.
12 The main benefits were identified as the efficiency gains from a common 
currency, in other words the reduction in costs concerning international transactions and the 
elimination of uncertainty concerning fluctuating exchange rates within the monetary union, 
which would generate more foreign trade and more competition. The loss of monetary policy 
autonomy was deemed to be the main cost of full EMU membership. The Swedish interest 
rate would no longer be set by the Riksbank in order to stabilize the domestic economy. 
Instead, the rate of interest would be determined for the monetary union as a whole by its 
central bank. The surrendering of monetary policy autonomy was believed to be associated 
with high costs for Sweden in the event of asymmetric shocks to the domestic economy. 
Thus, a Swedish currency with a floating exchange rate was viewed as an insurance device.
13  
 
In its analysis of the political aspects, also a part of the Commission's task, the Calmfors 
Commission argued that Sweden would gain influence within the EU by adopting the single 
currency. However, the political legitimacy of the forthcoming single European currency was 
regarded as weak by the Commission.  
In its conclusions, the Commission recommended Swedish membership in the long run, but 
proposed that Sweden should not enter Stage Three of the EMU in the short run, in other 
words at its start in 1999. The main economic argument was that, in the wake of the financial 
crisis of the early 1990s, Sweden would be highly vulnerable to country-specific shocks as 
long as unemployment remained high and the budget deficit large. Under these circumstances, 
fiscal policy was deemed ineffective as a tool to counteract any negative asymmetric shocks 
to the Swedish economy. Giving up monetary policy autonomy would therefore imply that 
any major new shock could raise unemployment to disastrously high levels. The Commission 
therefore suggested that Sweden should postpone introducing the single currency until 
unemployment had been reduced and the budget had been consolidated. The Commission also 
believed that public attitudes would become more positive towards EMU in due course.  
 
                                                 
12 The literature on the OCA theory, starting from Mundell (1961), is immense. OCA theory still remains unchallenged as the 
main theoretical tool for the analysis of the costs and benefits of monetary unification although the initial contributions were 
made in the early 1960s. However, this body of theory has evolved in various directions. For more recent surveys, see among 
others Artis (2003), De Grauwe (2003) and Mongelli (2002). 
13 See the summary in Chapter 13 of Calmfors et al (1997).   9
The Calmfors Report of 1996 had a strong impact on the public debate on Swedish euro 
membership that ensued. All parties regarded the report as a balanced and carefully 
researched assessment of the benefits and costs of entering a monetary union. In this way it 




The recommendation of the Calmfors Commission to postpone entry into the monetary union 
became initially the official position of the Government and the Parliament. The central bank 
reform of 1999, making the Riksbank more independent, was consistent with the 
recommendations of the Commission to reduce potential credibility problems for Sweden by 
staying outside the monetary union. However, the Government did not follow the advice of 
the Commission as regards preparing for Swedish entry by introducing comprehensive labour 
market reforms designed to improve the functioning of labour markets, and in this way 
reducing structural unemployment.  
 
The Government eventually aimed for euro-area membership. One step in this direction was 
taken by the appointment of a new Government Commission in 2000 consisting of 
economists with the task of examining the role of stabilization policies and proposing 
additional measures of stabilization in case Sweden entered Stage Three of the EMU.  
 
The final report of the Commission two years later, SOU 2002:16, acknowledged that 
Swedish membership of a monetary union would imply a loss in the capacity of the 
authorities to stabilize the Swedish economy because domestic monetary policy would no 
longer be a policy tool. It analyzed and proposed a number of measures to improve the 
efficiency of fiscal policies to compensate for the elimination of the power of the Riksbank to 
frame its policy towards domestic economic conditions, without finding a perfect substitute. 
In short, the Commission proposed increased reliance on temporary changes in taxes and 
expenditure, in particular in changes in the value added tax. It also recommended the 
establishment of an independent fiscal policy council to monitor and advice on the conduct of 
fiscal policy.
15 The focus in SOU 2002:16 was on the challenges facing fiscal policies if 
                                                 
14 The Calmfors Report was based on the original contribution of Mundell (1961). In subsequent work, Mundell (1973) took 
a more optimistic view of the benefits of monetary unification than in Mundell (1961), actually questioning the policy 
relevance of his previous analysis. The arguments of Mundell (1973) did not attract any interest in the Swedish debate prior 
to the referendum in 2003. See also De Grauwe (2003, chapter 2) comparing the policy implications of the two studies by 
Mundell.  
15 See the summary of SOU 2002:16 on pages 25-28.   10
Sweden adopted the single currency. As in the original Calmfors Report, distributional 
considerations did not emerge as an issue. 
 
Following the publication of SOU 2002:16 and the general election in September 2002, the 
Government decided in December 2002, to launch a referendum on the euro in September 
2003. This step intensified the debate on the pros and cons of euro membership. The debate 
within  the economics profession followed the OCA approach initially adopted by the 
Calmfors Commission in 1996. As a consequence of ongoing international research, 
arguments were added during the campaign, like for instance the trade-enhancing effects of a 
common currency, the endogeneity of monetary unions, the relationship between structural 
unemployment and the monetary regime, the impact of a common currency on capital market 
integration. Nevertheless, the economics profession was divided because the costs and 
benefits of monetary unification were weighted differently. Thus, economists were active 
within both camps during the referendum campaign.
16  
 
With its departure point in the traditional or original OCA approach and remaining within it, 
the economics profession focused on the trade-off between efficiency and stabilization. As a 
consequence, issues of distribution were hardly brought into their analysis – they played 
practically no role here. The mind-set of the economics profession was firmly moulded in the 
standard macroeconomic framework where distributional aspects are left out of the picture.
17  
 
This picture changed radically in the referendum debate outside the economics profession. 
Now the effects of the choice of the exchange rate regime on particular groups in society took 
the centre stage. As discussed in the next section, the No-campaign stressed that the risks or 
costs of the euro were not equally distributed across Swedish society. The euro was described 
by the No-side as a threat to those working in the public sector, in particular to women, and to 
those depending on transfers from the public sector. The rate of unemployment would 
increase if Sweden joined the euro, reaching average European levels. Thus, differences 
between various groups in society would increase unless the krona was kept as the domestic 
                                                 
16 While economists, with university as well as non-university employment, appeared quite evenly on both sides of the 
campaign, an interview study conducted by Lindqvist (2005) reveals that about 80 percent of Swedish professors who had 
carried out EMU-related research broadly defined were positive towards euro membership while 8 percent of them were 
negative. Most of the professors of economics active on the No-side in the media, two out of three, had not been involved in 
any EMU-related research. The opposite holds for the professors on the Yes-side.  
17 No systematic survey of the views and recommendations propounded by the economics profession on euro membership 
exists. Sverenius (2003), interviewing economists positive as well as negative towards the euro, contains a balanced mix of 
opinions. The arguments of ten economists positive to the euro are found in Jakobsson (2003).    11
currency.
18 These arguments ensured that the choice of currency was no longer a choice only 
between efficiency and stabilization but also a choice concerning the distribution of income 
and welfare across different segments of society.  
 
 
4. Analytical framework  
 
Which patterns of Yes and No-voting do we expect to find across groups in society according 
to economic theory? To answer this question we have followed a four-step procedure to 
identify a set of explanatory variables to consider in our empirical work. First, we explore the 
political economy of exchange rate regime determination, more specifically the OCA 
approach, to derive hypotheses. Second, we focus on the arguments used by the Yes and No-
camps during the campaign preceding the referendum in September 2003 in our search for 
testable hypotheses.  
 
As a third step, we broaden our outlook by moving to international evidence and surveying 
the determinants of public attitudes towards the euro, the single currency, as revealed in 
empirical studies. Fourth, the results from studies on European economic and political 
integration are presented. These studies are of interest as much suggests that groups in favour 
of integration might also favour membership of the euro area since the euro may be seen as an 
important step towards increased European integration. In short, factors making the public 
positive/negative towards economic and political integration are likely to make voters 
positive/negative to the euro as well. Finally, a set of hypotheses is singled out. 
 
4.1 Voting behaviour predicted by the OCA approach  
 
Since we focus on differences in voting patterns across society, the following question arises: 
Who is likely to benefit and who is likely to lose from membership of a monetary union? By 
wording the question in this way, distributional issues immediately take centre stage. A 
tentative answer can be derived from the theory of exchange rate regime choice, in short from 
the traditional theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). This body of theory will serve as our 
reference point to identify testable hypotheses concerning voting behaviour across the 
                                                 
18 See for example the summary of the arguments of the No-side by Wallin (2004, p. 164-67)    12
Swedish electorate. To our knowledge, this is a novel use of the OCA approach, as it is rarely 
applied to issues of distribution. Economists today tend to ignore or see no links between the 
choice of currency unit and the distribution of income and wealth.  
 
The major trade-off driving the traditional OCA approach stands between the efficiency gains 
from monetary unification - in other words from an irrevocably fixed exchange rate - and the 
benefits of stabilization offered by a flexible national exchange rate. The use of a common 
currency increases economic efficiency by reducing transaction costs in international trade 
and investments, thus increasing international trade and integration. On the other hand, the 
existence of a national currency - with a flexible exchange rate and thus of a domestic central 
bank setting interest rates - offers an insurance device to counteract negative disturbances, 
usually described as asymmetric, country-specific or idiosyncratic shocks. Insurance, 
interpreted in a broad sense, is obtained by the greater degree of domestic policy autonomy 
offered by a domestic currency than by an arrangement with perfectly fixed exchange rates.
19  
 
In short, we expect the trade-off between reducing transaction costs by entering a monetary 
union and obtaining macroeconomic insurance through a domestic currency with a flexible 
exchange rate to be reflected in different voting patterns across groups in society as the 
relative benefits and costs are likely to be unevenly distributed. Consequently, voters who 
value the reduced transaction costs and thus increased international trade and integration will 
tend to support a common currency to a larger extent than voters who see fewer benefits from 
international trade and integration. Likewise, voters who are able to find better insurance and 
protection through private measures will tend to support a common currency to a larger extent 
than voters that rely more on macroeconomic insurance and protection through domestic 
policy autonomy. Next, these general conclusions are developed into a number of more 
specific hypotheses.  
 
Voters who see their income closely linked to the international economy would benefit more 
than other voters from a monetary union through the increased opportunities of trade and 
international contacts attributed to a common currency, including those related to the 
reduction in exchange rate uncertainty. These positive effects may be counteracted by 
pressure emerging from stronger international competition. The very same groups may also 
                                                 
19 Insurance refers here not only to monetary policy and the domestic control of interest rates but also to fiscal policy and 
other policy measures that can be taken by the nation state given the existence of a national currency.   13
feel they derive insurance from a flexible exchange rate, in particular if they are active in 
sectors that are exposed to a high incidence of shocks stemming from international sources. 
Thus, the groups that stand to gain the most from reduced transaction costs are to some extent 
also the ones that stand the most to lose from giving up the flexible exchange rate as an 
insurance device. The effect that dominates for the internationally exposed groups is in other 
words an empirical matter.
20 
 
Furthermore, a diversified economy gives better protection against macroeconomic shocks 
than a specialized one. Thus, voters in diversified regions are likely to be more in favour of 
the euro than voters in regions depending on one or a few industries. In particular, this 
argument is valid when the industry structure differs from that of the euro area average since 
the monetary policy of the ECB is then less likely to be in line with local business conditions. 
 
Voters with no or little exposure to the international economy and who depend primarily on 
domestic economic developments or with employment in the public sector are likely to prefer 
national policy autonomy to membership in a monetary union. Such national or domestic 
policy independence offers them better insurance against domestic as well as international 
disturbances, symmetric as well as asymmetric ones, than an irrevocably fixed rate. At the 
same time they are likely to see no immediate benefits from increased international trade and 
integration. Thus, we predict that voters in the public sector, either employed by or depending 
on transfers from it, would prefer a domestic currency rather than an international one. 
 
A number of additional predictions can be derived from the OCA approach. Voters with high 
incomes and higher education are likely to benefit more from the internationalization of 
product, capital and labour markets than low-income voters with a low level of education. 
They travel more across borders; they are more likely to work and live abroad, and carry out 
real and financial investments abroad. Since high-income earners are better protected against 
shocks and disturbances in their capacity as wealthier people possessing alternative 
opportunities, we expect them to vote yes to a common currency to a larger extent than low-
income earners. To the extent that party affiliation and ideology is determined by economic 
characteristics, in other words that high-income earners tend to support parties to the right and 
low-income earners parties to the left of the political spectrum, we would expect voters to the 
                                                 
20 Note that Mayda et al (2007) find that risk aversion are related to anti-trade attitudes and that this effect is smaller in 
countries where the government provides substantial income insurance.    14
right to support the euro to a greater extent and voters to the left to give relatively more 
support to the domestic currency.  
 
Due to lack of data, there is little research on the impact of different exchange rate regimes on 
the distribution of income and wealth.
21 Still, available empirical work on the political 
economy of exchange rate regimes roughly supports the predictions of the OCA approach as 
outlined above. Surveying the US record, Frieden (1994) suggests that “Internationally-
oriented economic groups prefer fixed exchange rates, domestically based groups prefer 
floating rates”.




According to the OCA approach, we should expect fixed exchange rates to be maintained by 
countries with extremely large open sectors. It is true if we look at Hong Kong, Singapore and 
city-states such as Andorra, we see examples of very open economies with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. On the other hand, countries with relatively closed economies, such as the 
United States and the euro area, adhere to floating exchange rates.
24 In a country like Sweden, 
neither fully open nor fully closed, the benefits and costs of monetary unification are likely to 
be unevenly distributed across society; at least voters in different sectors of the economy are 
expected to perceive the gains and losses differently.
25 This is an empirical issue that we will 
turn to later on. 
 
4.2 Voting behaviour predicted by the referendum campaign  
 
The public debate preceding the referendum concerned a broader set of arguments for and 
against the euro than those stemming from the standard economic theory of monetary unions, 
                                                 
21 See for example Eichengreen and Frieden (2001, p. 12): “There is almost no empirical work that successfully measures the 
distributional effects of different international monetary regimes.” 
22 Using econometric tests to examine the voting behaviour in the 1896 US presidential election, an election where the choice 
of exchange rate system was a crucial issue, Eichengreen (1995, pp. 25-29) found support for a political economy 
explanation of the share of votes of the two presidential candidates. 
23 The theory of exchange rate regimes also supplies predictions concerning the appropriate level of the exchange rate to 
enter a monetary union. In short, according to Frieden (1994, p. 85); “producers of tradable goods favour a relatively lower 
(more depreciated) exchange rate, which makes their products cheaper relative to foreign goods. On the other hand, 
producers of non-tradables support a relatively higher exchange rate. This also holds for international investors”. The choice 
of entry rate for the krona into the euro area was not an issue in the Swedish euro referendum, although it emerged a few 
times in the debate. 
24 See for example Eichengreen and Leblang (2003, p. 805): “More open economies are more likely to peg, as predicted by 
the theory of optimum currency areas”. 
25 The ratio of exports to GDP was around 44 per cent in Sweden at the time of the euro referendum. The corresponding ratio 
for the US and the euro area was much smaller.    15
dealing with economic as well as non-economic issues. The consequences on the distribution 
of income of a flexible and a fixed exchange rate of the krona were compared. A host of 
political views concerning the future of Sweden as a nation state, as a welfare state and as a 
democracy emerged. Most prominently, the role of the welfare state and the tax system as an 
insurance mechanism was given a great deal of attention. It is difficult to do justice to the 
multitude of opinions expressed in the summer of 2003.




4.2.1. The arguments of “Yes to the euro” 
 
The Yes-camp primarily stressed the economic benefits of euro membership. Trade and 
competition would increase, the rate of interest would fall, and economic growth and 
employment would rise. New jobs would be created. Membership of the euro area would 
contribute to fiscal discipline. Sweden was so strongly integrated with Europe that 
membership of the euro area was a necessary step to take. The Yes-campaign presented very 
detailed calculations of the rise in employment for every municipality of Sweden. 
 
There was a political dimension to the Yes-campaign as well. Sweden would be able to 
influence EU policies to a greater extent as a member of the euro area than as an outsider. 
Sweden should break away from its neutral stance and play a more active role in forming the 
future of Europe. The euro was viewed as a method of establishing peace and prosperity in 
Europe. A No to euro-area membership would contribute to isolationism and xenophobia. In a 
globalised world, national independence for a country like Sweden was deemed fairly 
restricted anyway. Thus, it was better to be part of the euro area than to stay outside it.
27 
 
4.2.2 The arguments of “No to the euro” 
 
The No-camp also emphasized economic factors. It stressed the insurance value of having a 
national central bank that could target the domestic rate of inflation and maintain a floating 
exchange rate, isolating Sweden from country-specific shocks. Swedish unemployment would 
rise to the average EU level if Sweden joined as the ECB gives priority to low inflation. The 
                                                 
26 So far, there is no complete study of the arguments of the Yes and No-sides available. A chronology of the campaign is 
given in appendix 2 in Dahlsson and Johansson (2004). The arguments are also discussed in the various contributions in 
Oscarsson and Holmberg (2004a). 
27 The arguments of the Yes-campaign as they emerged in the media are summarized by Wallin (2004).   16
No-side argued that euro membership would restrict the Swedish welfare state, restrain taxes 
and public expenditure, reducing the scope of transfer payments. Fewer resources would be 
available for schools, hospitals and public care for both young and old. Thus, the burden of a 
Swedish euro membership would fall disproportionately on those dependent on the public 
sector, on low-income earners, on women, on the poor and the unemployed.
28 Inequality 
would increase. In short, the euro was described as a threat to the Swedish model, in 
particular as a threat to women and groups depending on the public sector.
29  
 
In addition, the euro was projected as a risky currency, a political construction that had not yet 
proved that it was going to survive. The slow growth on the European continent, in particular 
in Germany, and the failure to adhere to the fiscal discipline as set out by the Stability and 
Growth Pact were taken as proof of the problems of the single currency.  
 
The No-camp brought up several political issues against the euro. The process of European 
economic and monetary integration was described as a threat to Swedish democracy. Crucial 
decisions would be moved from the Riksdag in Stockholm to “Brussels” and from the 
Riksbank to the ECB in Frankfurt. Swedish voters would lose power and influence in the 
event of a Yes to the euro. There was a nationalistic streak in the No-campaign as well: The 
Swedish model was a better model than those of the euro members. Swedish unemployment 
was lower than in the euro area and Swedish economic growth was higher.
30 The balance of 
power on the Swedish labour market would change in favour of the employers while the 
power of the unions would be reduced. The No-camp also argued that Sweden could wait and 
see how the euro evolved, thus a No could be reversed while a Yes was irreversible and thus 
riskier and more dangerous than a No.  
 
From the above account of the arguments presented by the Yes and No-sides in the run-up to 
the referendum in 2003 we are able to derive a set of explanatory variables. We would expect 
the following patterns. Voters benefiting from the opportunities created by international trade 
                                                 
28 The arguments of the No-campaign as they emerged in the media are presented by Wallin (2004).  
29 See for example Wibe and Johansson (2004, p. 104), both active in the No-campaign, describing the risk profile of full 
EMU membership in the following way: "The risks involved from EMU membership are not uniformly distributed across the 
population. Those most exposed on the labour market, those with the lowest education and lowest income, take a greater risk 
than others."  
30 See Widfeldt (2004) for an analysis of the role of nationalism in the referendum-campaign preceding the euro referendum 
and as a determinant of the election outcome. He finds a pattern suggesting that No-voters were more critical of 
internationalism, multiculturalism, labour immigration, development aid, and refugees and more willing to support Swedish 
values than Yes-voters.    17
and finance would tend to vote for the euro compared to other groups. We also expect those 
groups that have best “labour market insurance” to vote for the euro to a larger extent than 
groups that have less “labour market insurance”, in other words those who are less likely to 
get a new job quickly at roughly the same pay as the previous job. Well-educated voters, 
high-income earners, professionals, white-collar workers and urban voters are more likely to 
vote for the euro than less-educated, low-income earners, blue-collar workers and voters 
residing in rural areas. Voters dependent on public-sector transfers and wages such as the 
unemployed, those on sick leave, pensioners, and public-sector employees are predicted to 
vote for the domestic or national currency to a larger extent than voters with a high income, 
working in the private sector with a higher level of education.  
 
Thus, we arrive at roughly the same predictions as those derived earlier from the OCA 
approach. This is not surprising since the campaign rhetoric was strongly influenced by the 
OCA interpretation adopted by the economics profession in Government Reports and public 
debate prior to the referendum. The proponents of a Yes to the euro stressed the expected 
benefits of a monetary union, playing down the expected costs, while the No-proponents did 
the opposite, thus projecting and reinforcing the economic incentives driving voting 
behaviour in the referendum. The No-side also argued that the most disadvantaged segments 
of society would be exposed to the greatest risks of euro membership. 
 
4.3 Voting behaviour predicted by public attitudes towards the euro  
 
So far we have dealt with the Swedish record. It may be that our predictions are due to 
specific Swedish institutional, political and historical features. For this reason we consider 
here and in the next section evidence from other countries. By now the determinants of 
attitudes towards the euro and the EMU have been examined in several empirical studies. 
Many of them are based on data from the period prior to the introduction of the euro. 
Practically all studies are founded on data collected by the Eurobarometer surveys, more 
specifically on the replies given by individuals to questions that are related to their attitudes 
towards the single currency. 
 
From this empirical literature we can distil a number of economic and political variables that 
exert a significant impact on the support of the single currency. These variables are 
summarized below as well as in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 lists the variables that have   18
proved to be significant in statistical work on individual data. In a similar vein, Table 2 covers 
variables identified in studies based on country-specific characteristics.
31  
 
Education (human capital). Human capital or the level of education is commonly a significant 
variable. The standard explanation is that individuals with higher education are able to benefit 
economically from the market opportunities created by the euro through trade, finance and 
labour mobility. Likewise citizens with good occupational skills are likely to gain more from 
the euro than those who are less skilled. This explanatory factor is closely linked to personal 
income and wealth as discussed below. These results emerge from several studies according 
to Table 1. 
 
Personal income and wealth (financial capital): Individuals with high incomes (due to 
occupational skills/higher education) and with large asset holdings stand to benefit more from 
a monetary union with free movement of capital across borders than individuals with low 
incomes. Wealthy people have the capacity to benefit from the openness of capital markets. It 
is also suggested that membership of a monetary union will reduce the extent of redistributive 
policies, in this way favouring the wealthy as well. Tests of the effects of the real income of 
voters tend to prove that this variable is significant for the support of the single currency as 
seen in Table 1.  
 
Employment/unemployment: Individuals who are unemployed are usually found at the lower 
end of the income scale. Empirical work demonstrates that unemployment leads to a rejection 
of the euro. The exact mechanism behind this attitude is unclear. The unemployed see few 
benefits in a single currency. They may view it as a threat to unemployment benefits received 
from the State or as a source of additional competitive pressure that keeps companies away 
from recruiting new staff.  
 
Closeness to border: Border residents or citizens living close to a border with another member 
of the monetary union have been found more supportive of the euro than those living far from 
the borders. This group is expected to gain more from cross-border shopping by being able to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities which arise due to the use of the single currency.  
                                                 
31 Tables 1 and 2 present a very stylized picture of the econometric results. Often the outcome of the tests is modified and 
qualified depending on the set of countries used, data employed, specification of the tests etc. Thus, the picture given by the 
two tables should be regarded as a highly simplified one. 
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Men/women: Many studies use sex as a control variable, usually finding a significant effect. 
Men are as a rule more positive towards the single currency than women. This pattern holds 
across countries. Few convincing economic arguments for this gender effect have been 
established so far.  
 
Age: Age is a common control variable. However, no clear and stable pattern emerges for age. 
Sometimes the view is put forward that the older generation would prefer a single currency 
because they remember the devastation of World War II and thus view the euro as a sign of 
peaceful cooperation that might prevent new wars in the future. Such an effect has been 
difficult to establish. On the other hand, older people may find adjusting to a new currency 
more difficult than younger people.  
 
Sectoral characteristics/locality: Few firm empirical results have emerged concerning the 
impact of occupation in different sectors of society. One reason is that there is scant data on 
the sectoral background of the respondents in the Eurobarometer surveys which are the 
standard statistical database used. However, respondents living in urban areas are commonly 
found to be more positive towards the euro than those living in rural areas.  
 
Political outlook: Political attitudes are often found to be central determinants of support for 
or resistance to the single currency. They basically reflect the history of the domestic country 
concerning independence and macroeconomic performance. According to one interpretation 
based on the assumption of a class struggle between labour and capital, voters to the right 
(capitalists, investors, managers etc) prefer a low and stable rate of inflation to hold down the 
nominal wage demands of the labour class while those to the left prefer high inflation to 
accommodate the wage requests made by unions and workers. Thus, right-leaning citizens 
support the single currency while left-leaning citizens are sceptical of the benefits of a 
monetary union. The presumption is that membership in the monetary union will deliver a 
lower rate of inflation than a domestic currency arrangement.  
 
National political culture/national pride: Citizens who value the domestic political system 
and traditions highly tend to reject the idea of a single currency.
32  
                                                 
32 See for example Kaltenthaler and Anderson (1999).   20
 
Support for the national government: Several studies have found that citizens who support or 
are in favour of the domestic government are expected to vote for the single currency. The 
reason is that national governments are as a rule in favour of full membership of the EMU.  
 
Other factors: Some studies focus on the determinants of public support of the EMU during 
the convergence process preceding the introduction of the euro in January 1999. During the 
run-up to the EMU, support for EMU membership was higher in countries with high inflation 
and high debt to GDP ratios.
33 Thus, the disciplining effect of EMU membership was 
appreciated by the public in countries lacking such discipline. Length of time as member of 
the EMS has also proved to be positively related to support for the euro. In the Swedish euro 
referendum in 2003, such effects were barely of any interest since Sweden had maintained a 
rate of inflation lower than the euro area for quite some time and since the public finances 
were in order after the boom-bust crisis in the early 1990s. 
 
A basic impression from Table 1 and Table 2 is that almost all of the economic or socio-
economic variables are related to distributive issues. In short, the individuals who are likely to 
benefit from a single currency are found to be more favourable to entering into a monetary 
union, while those that see no clear benefits or expect costs from leaving the domestic 
currency tend to reject the idea of the euro.  
 
 
4.4 Voting behaviour predicted by public attitudes towards European integration 
 
As a consequence of increased cooperation within Europe, economists and political scientists 
have turned to studies of the determinants of public attitudes towards European economic 
integration. By now about 40 referenda regarding European issues have taken place in the EU, 
serving as a major source of inspiration for research on public support for European 
integration. Factors making the public positive as well as negative towards increased 
economic and political cooperation are likely explanatory variables to use in our tests of 
voting behaviour in the euro referendum. These factors that influence the attitudes towards 
                                                 
33 Gärtner (1997).   21
integration are summarized in Table 3 and Table 4, covering individual level and country 
characteristics. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 reveal roughly the same patterns as in Tables 1 and 2 concerning determinants 
of public support for the euro. A high income, wealth, higher education, border residence, and 
employment are positively related to support for European economic and political integration. 
On the other hand, a low income, low level of education and unemployment are negatively 
related. Women are less enthusiastic about integration than men. Positive expectations about 
their future personal income and about the national economy make individuals positive 
towards the further integration of the EU. National identity is negatively associated with 
support for integration. Age is not a significant predictor of attitudes towards integration. 
 
The strong similarities between the determinants of support for the euro and for integration 
suggest that the public across Europe views the euro as an integral part of the European 
integration process. We should thus expect that the empirical results concerning European 
integration will be demonstrated in the Swedish euro referendum as well.  
 
4.5 Hypotheses to be tested 
 
We may now summarize our overview of potential explanatory variables for differences in 
voting behaviour across Swedish society. Theoretical reasoning and empirical studies suggest 
a number of testable hypotheses regarding the Swedish euro referendum, of course only 
testable where data is available to us. Condensing the arguments from above, we expect the 
following economic variables to be positively related to support for the euro: high income, 
higher education, employment, private sector employment, living in urban areas, and 
exposure to international trade. The last point depends, however, on whether the benefits from 
the lower transactions costs of international exchange dominate the loss of the krona, the 
national currency, as an insurance device. On the other hand, we expect voters with a low 
income, low level of education, who are unemployed or employed in the public sector and 
other sectors closed to international trade and exposure, who are dependent on transfers from 
the public sector, who live in rural areas, and areas with a labour market prone to asymmetric 
shocks to reject the euro by voting in favour of the krona to a larger extent than other groups 
of voters.  
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Judging from international patterns, we expect men to be more favourable to the euro than 
women, and age not to be a significant determinant of the vote. We also expect a border 
effect, in other words voters who live close to a border with the euro area, i.e. with Finland in 
the north and Denmark and Germany in the south, to be more in favour of the euro than voters 
living further towards the centre of Sweden.  
 
Turning to the role of attitudes towards Sweden and the EU and to political affiliation, we 
expect voters favourable towards European integration and the EU to vote for the euro to a 
greater extent than voters favourable towards Swedish identity and Swedish national policy 
autonomy. We also expect a political or ideological dimension in the sense that right-wing 
voters are likely to be more in favour of the euro than left-wing voters.  
 
Basically our suggested tests evolve around the gains from reduced transaction costs and the 
loss of macroeconomic insurance. These patterns are roughly the same as those suggested 
above by the OCA approach although amended with the structural characteristics of Swedish 
society. Let us now turn to our empirical study.  
 
 
5. Empirical methodology 
 
In the empirical analysis, we have access to two sets of data, for individuals and for 
municipalities.  For individual level data, we use a probit model to estimate the probability of 
an individual voting Yes to the euro, in other words for full membership of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). Our point of departure is the following relationship: 
 
(1)  Probability of voting Yesi = a0 + a1 Costsi + a2 Benefitsi + Other determinantsi  
      
In plain English, we estimate the probability of a respondent voting Yes, while we control for 
a host of factors that may have influenced his or her decision.
34 We use i to indicate 
individuals. Costi and Benefitsi are the variables indicating the possible costs (or risks) and 
benefits (or income gains) associated with membership of the euro area as perceived by the 
                                                 
34 More formally, we estimate




ββ β == Φ + + + xX β  where  () Φ⋅is the standard 
normal cumulative density function and X is a vector of control variables.   23
individual voter. Other determinantsi are a set of control variables that may influence the 
voting decision of an individual. 
 
When we analyze the aggregate (municipal) level data, we estimate the determinants of the 
regional share of votes in favour of euro membership. More formally, we estimate the 
following relationship using ordinary least squares: 
 
(2)   Share of  Yes-votesm = b0 + b1 Costsm + b2 Benefitsm + Other determinantsm 
 
Naturally, m indicates municipalities. As in the first equation, Other determinants represent a 
set of control variables allowing us to take various background characteristics into account. In 
order to further test the derived hypotheses, we also include interaction effects between 
municipal level variables and individual characteristics. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) reflect the trade-off highlighted by the OCA approach. Here the voters 
face a choice between the costs and benefits of adopting the euro compared to staying with 
the krona. The cost term represents the loss of macroeconomic insurance from eliminating the 
domestic currency and thus the opportunity cost of a domestic monetary policy. We do not 
have explicit measures of the costs and benefits of monetary unification. Instead we construct 
a set of proxy variables for these concepts. To sum up, our tests will demonstrate to what 
extent the public holds a consistent OCA-model in its mind when voting for or against the 
euro.  
 
6. Data used 
 
We make use of two different data sources. The first is the exit poll conducted during the day 
of the referendum in 2003. This data allows us to analyze the determinants of individual level 
attitudes towards entering the euro area. The main advantage of this data set is that it is 
collected at the lowest possible level of aggregation, that is from the individual voter. The 
main disadvantage is that we are constrained by the set of questions asked in the exit poll 
survey. In addition, regional characteristics may have important effects on voting behaviour 
not revealed in the use of individual data. For these reasons, we explore municipal level data 
that allows us to examine more aggregate determinants of voting patterns. The two data   24
sources are merged as well, thereby allowing us to examine the interaction between individual 
and municipal level characteristics.  
 
6.1. Exit poll data 
 
An exit poll was conducted during the Swedish euro referendum by the Swedish public 
service television broadcaster, SVT. The poll was carried out in 80 election districts and at 40 
postal voting stations on the day of the election. The location of the polling stations is a 
municipal indicator used to merge the exit poll and the municipal level data.
35 Out of 
Sweden’s 290 municipalities, 83 were represented in the exit poll. In total, 10,731 responses 
were gathered, and the response rate was approximately 78 percent.
36  
 
The main outcome variable is a binary indicator taking the value 1 if an individual voted Yes 
to euro membership, and 0 if the vote is a No to euro membership. In order to check the 
representativeness of the exit poll data, we aggregated the exit poll responses to the municipal 
level and compared the aggregated vote shares to the actual vote shares in the 83 
municipalities for which we had overlapping data. From the exit poll we obtained an average 
(standard deviation) of 41 (13) percent Yes-votes, and in the municipal level data there were 
37 (11) percent Yes-votes. Thus, there is some indication of an over-sampling of Yes-voters 
in the exit poll, but in our opinion the difference is small.  
 
The respondents were then asked to rank the importance of certain policy dimensions that 
influenced their decision. The respondents were asked to put a weight (on a scale from one to 
five) on the importance of each policy dimension such as the Interest Rate, the Welfare State, 
the  Swedish Economy, the respondent’s Private Economy, the value of National 
Independence, the value of being able to Influence the EU, and Gender Equality.
37  
 
Since some groups may have systematically assigned higher or lower weights across all these 
questions, we normalize the variables with the average weight across all motivational 
answers. Thus, we in effect analyze the importance of each answer, compared to all the other 
                                                 
35 Since voters were allowed to vote in post offices in other municipalities than where they resided or worked, the match is 
not perfect. However, the measurement error induced by the matching is likely to be insignificant. 
36 The exit poll method is described in Hernborn et al (2002). 
37 Other motivations were also given in the exit poll. Since our focus is on more narrow economic reasons behind voting 
behaviour, we limited our empirical analysis to the above-mentioned questions.   25
motives of the respondent. While this procedure removes some of the variation in the data, it 
also reduces the risk of finding a spurious relationship between the motives behind the vote 
and the various groups we were analyzing. 
 
In the exit poll, the respondents provided information concerning their general attitudes 
towards the EU, their favoured political party (at the time of the referendum and during the 
national elections of 2002), ideological position (on a right-left scale), sex, year of birth, 
citizenship (Swedish or other), trade union membership (which one, if any), employment 
status (employed, unemployed, retired, student, etc), work classification (white and blue-
collar labour, self-employed, entrepreneurs of small firms (1-9 employees), entrepreneurs of 
large firms (10+ employees), sector of employment (public, municipal or government, or 
private employment), and where the respondent and his/her parents grew up (rural, small-
town, or city, or abroad).  
 
Ideally, we would have preferred information concerning the respondents’ level of income 
and education, which was not provided by the survey. However, trade union membership and 
work classification can serve as good proxies for this information. Basically, the trade union 
confederation, LO, organizes blue-collar workers, TCO low and middle level white-collar 
workers, and SACO professionals with an academic degree. Entrepreneurs are divided into 
three groups: the self-employed, those with 1-9 and those with over 10 employees.  
 
Summary statistics of the exit poll data are presented in Table 5. Tests of differences between 
Yes and No-voters are also shown in this table. Among the more interesting differences we 
find that women were very significantly less willing to join the euro. The same holds for blue-
collar workers (and members of LO, the blue-collar union confederation), the unemployed, 
those on early retirement, and those employed in the municipal sector. Hardly surprising from 
a Swedish perspective is the fact that left-wing voters were much less willing to join the 
single currency than right-wing ones.  
 
As for the motives behind the vote, we can conclude that the voters at the aggregate level 
clearly understood what the referendum was about. No-voters assigned a greater weight to the 
Interest Rate as a motivation behind their decision. They also assigned a greater weight to 
Independence, Gender equality and the Welfare State. Yes-voters, on the other hand, assigned 
a relatively high weight to Sweden’s capacity to Influence the EU and to the Swedish   26
Economy. There was no difference between the weight Yes and No-voters assigned to their 
Private Economy.  
 
Charts 1-3 display additional differences across groups of voters. There was a clear 
ideological division in the referendum. Voters to the left tended to reject the euro while voters 
to the right accepted the single currency (Chart 1). Voters favourable towards a United States 
of Europe tended to support the euro (Chart 2). Chart 3 demonstrates a strong relationship 
between the attitudes towards Swedish EU membership and towards the euro, if you were for 
EU membership you tended to vote Yes to the euro. Chart 2 and 3 bring out the positive 
connection between attitudes towards European integration and towards the euro.  
 
6.2 Regional data 
 
Statistics Sweden provides a wealth of information concerning Sweden’s 290 municipalities. 
For the aggregate level analysis, the main dependent variable is the share of votes in favour of 
euro membership for every municipality as stated in equation (2).
38 Apart from a set of 
“standard” explanatory variables at the municipality level such as local income, educational 
level, population size and population density, various age groups, and data on social 
conditions such as the local unemployment rate and the share of the population living on 
welfare, some variables warrant a closer description. 
 
In order to measure the impact of trade (and hence the exchange rate exposure) of the local 
economy, a trade exposure index is created for each municipality. This is done by weighting 
the international trade share of sector i with the employment share within sector i in region m. 
More formally, the index is constructed as follows: 
 
  Trade exposure (Employment share Trade share ) mi m i
i
=× ∑ . 
Data on municipal level employment shares is obtained from the RAMS-database at Statistics 
Sweden. Data on industry level trade is obtained from the OECD STAN database. Similar 
                                                 
38 Since this variable is bounded between 0 and 1, we followed the standard procedure and performed 
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indices are constructed for import and export exposure respectively, and for total trade (as 
well as for imports and exports), trade with the EU, trade with the euro area and so on.  
 
Another way of measuring the local impact of changes in the exchange rate regime is to 
measure the differences in the local industrial structure compared to the euro area industrial 
structure. Since we do not have production data at a detailed regional level, we again use 




2 Difference in employment (Employment share  Employment share ) m im i EURO
i
=− ∑  
Using the squared difference means that we put greater weight on large differences. This is to 
capture the intuitive notion that the difference between two regions with a ten percent 
difference in one industry is more important than if the regions had a one percent difference in 
ten industries. Data for these variables is again obtained from RAMS and the OECD STAN. 
Since this variable is supposed to capture the risk exposure of a region, it is aggregated to the 
local labour market level, rather than to the municipal level.
39 Further, the index is based on 
the 18 (out of 42) sectors containing tradables. The reason is that the service sector, which to 
a large extent is part of the public sector in Sweden, is not exposed to the same types of 
shocks as the tradable sectors. In particular, shocks to the tradable sectors are not as sensitive 
to local policy choices as the public sector.  
 
Summary statistics for the regional level variables are presented in Table 6 and a correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 7. The correlations indicate that voters in municipalities exposed 
to trade (especially exports) with the euro area and with large differences in employment 
patterns compared to the euro area were less willing to accept the euro. The other correlations 
basically mimic the differences shown in Table 5; public employment, unemployment, and 
the share of inhabitants on sick leave or early retirement are strongly negatively correlated 
with the share of Yes-votes. High-income municipalities and regions with a large share of 
university-educated inhabitants, on the other hand, have a higher share of Yes-voters. 
 
                                                 
39 Statistics Sweden has defined 87 local labour markets in Sweden. These are defined according to actual commuting 
patterns.   28
This relationship is also highlighted in the scatter plot in Chart 4, demonstrating the 
correlation between the share of No-votes with paid absence from the labour market – paid in 
the sense of being financed through support from the public sector. Chart 4 illustrates three 
extreme cases. The municipality of Danderyd outside Stockholm had the greatest share of 
Yes-votes and the lowest share of paid absence from the labour market. Strömsund in 
Northern Sweden had the highest share of No-votes and an extremely large share of paid 
absence. Haparanda, further to the north than Strömsund, on the border with Finland is a 
striking outlier. Although it had the highest share of paid absence of any municipality, the 
majority of the voters in Haparanda supported the euro. As argued previously, the proximity 




7. Empirical results 
 
We first report the main results from the individual level probit-regressions, thereafter we 
move on to the municipal level results. Finally, the two levels of aggregation are combined.  
 
7.1 Individual determinants of voting behaviour  
 
In the first specification of Table 8 – see column (1) - we estimate the impact of some basic 
demographic characteristics on the probability of an individual voting in favour of the euro 
compared to the base group shown in parenthesis. The coefficients shown in Table 8 represent 
marginal effects. Thus, an estimate of say 0.08 means that members of that group are 8 
percent more likely to vote in favour of euro membership relative to the base group.
40 Women 
were more reluctant to adopt the euro than men and Swedish citizens less willing to join than 
foreign citizens who voted in the referendum. Age was positively related to the willingness to 
join, but the effect was not linear, as shown by the negative sign for the squared age term. 
This means that while the average effect of being a year older was positive, this effect was 
smaller for older than for younger voters. Having a parent born outside of Sweden increased 
                                                 
40 The interpretation of marginal effects in the probit model is a bit tricky. The reason is that the size of the effect depends on 
where in the distribution the effect is evaluated. In all regressions, the marginal effect is evaluated at the sample mean. 
Another approach would be to estimate a linear probability model, which has the disadvantage of not taking into account the 
fact that the probability of voting Yes must be between zero and one.    29
the probability of the respondent being in favour of membership. Those who had grown up in 
rural areas were more negative towards membership than others. 
 
In the second specification, shown in column (2), we add a set of socio-economic indicator 
variables. Union members of the blue-collar (LO) and low/middle level white-collar (TCO) 
trade union confederations were significantly more reluctant to adopt the euro compared to 
members of the Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) and those without trade 
union membership. Compared to those with employment, those unemployed or on early 
retirement were less willing to adopt the single currency. Students, on the other hand, were 
more willing to introduce the euro. Compared to blue collar-workers, white-collar, the self-
employed and entrepreneurs were more positive towards the euro. Respondents employed in 
the private sector and in the government sector were more willing to enter than those in the 
municipal sector. Adding these socio-economic variables had a minor effect on the estimates 
for the demographic characteristics as revealed when comparing column (1) with column (2).  
 
In the third specification, see column (3) in Table 8, we add variables indicating the political 
attitudes of the voters. Since political attitudes themselves are determined by some underlying 
preference functions, it is not obvious that they should be included in the regression. Or 
rather, they should be treated as endogenously (jointly) determined with the referendum vote. 
This means that the political attitudes are determined to some extent by the same underlying 
factors that determine the respondents’ referendum vote. By just including these attitude 
variables, therefore, we are likely to overestimate the effect of attitudes on the election result 
and underestimate the effect of the underlying factors.  
 
The ideal way to deal with this endogeneity problem is to find instrumental variables for the 
attitude variables. Such instruments are variables that are related to the attitude variable we 
are interested in, but not in themselves related to the variable we are seeking to explain. 
However, such variables are difficult to find. In the absence of any obvious variables that 
could work as instruments for political attitudes, we include indicator variables for right-wing 
and left-wing ideological leanings, as well as an indicator taking the value one if the 
respondent wanted Sweden to leave the EU altogether. Hardly surprising, the attitude 
variables are highly significant and the inclusion improves the fit of the regression 
substantially; from a pseudo R-squared of 0.07 to 0.26. Considering yourself left wing (right 
wing) was associated with a 7 (22) percent lower (higher) probability of voting in favour of   30
euro membership. Those who wanted Sweden to leave the EU were 53 percent more likely 
than other respondents to vote against euro membership. Including the attitude variables as a 




7.2 Aggregate determinants of voting behaviour 
 
Table 9 displays our regression results for Sweden’s 290 municipalities. Our large set of 
control variables appears to have captured most of the variation in the data. A high income 
and/or high level of education were associated with a larger proportion of Yes-votes.
42 A 
larger share of public employment, a larger share of inhabitants on social welfare, in 
unemployment or on sick leave/early retirement were associated with more votes against the 
euro. A larger share of foreign-born inhabitants and a larger municipal population had a 
positive impact on the share of Yes-votes.  
 
We find a non-linear pattern as regards the age groups. The young eligible voters (ages 18-30) 
appear to have been relatively negative towards membership. The old (65-74) were in favour, 
while the very old (75+) were more reluctant to join. Municipalities with a large proportion of 
small children (ages 0-10) did not differentiate themselves from other regions. All regressions 
also included eight (unreported) regional indicator variables classifying regions along the 
city-rural dimension.
43 These dummies show that the support for the euro was higher in larger 
cities, and particularly in the southern part of Sweden (the Malmö region). So far, the 
aggregate level results in Table 9 are closely aligned to those of the individual level 
regressions in Table 8.  
 
Now we add our measures of trade exposure and differences in employment patterns to the 
municipal regressions, in this way getting a more direct test of the costs and benefits of 
monetary unification. In the first column of Table 9, we see that trade exposure was 
                                                 
41 In a crude attempt to find an instrument for attitudes towards the EU, we used the level of trust in politicians as an 
instrument for the “leave the EU” variable. As alternative instruments, indicators of those not voting or voting “blank” in the 
2002 parliamentary/general election were used. While both sets of instruments are strongly related to the “leave the EU” 
variable, this approach is questionable. Basically, one attitude (towards the EU) is instrumented with another set of attitudes 
(towards politicians and the political system). Since it is hard to convincingly argue that one set of attitudes is “more 
exogenous” than the other, we have chosen not to report the results here (they are available upon request). Briefly, the results 
are similar to those in column (3) in Table 8, but the estimated effects for some socio-economic variables are somewhat 
smaller in size. 
42 The high correlation between income and education levels makes it difficult to separate the effects of these variables.  
43 These are so called ”H-regions”.    31
negatively related to the share of Yes-votes. Similarly, regions where the employment 
structure differs from the employment pattern of the euro area were also less willing to join 
than the average. Since the insurance value of the krona is relatively high in regions where the 
tradable sector is large, and where the employment pattern differs from the European average, 
both these results indicate that the decision to keep the Swedish krona was, at least to some 
extent, driven by an insurance motive.  
 
In columns (2) and (3) in Table 9, the trade exposure index is replaced by an export and 
import exposure index, respectively. The point estimate of the export index is larger than that 
of the import index, indicating that the insurance value was judged as relatively large in the 
export sectors. In columns (4)-(6), trade indices based only on trade with the euro area are 
used. The pattern from the first three columns becomes even more apparent. Municipalities 
with a great deal of trade exposure to the euro area tended to vote against membership of the 
monetary union. This is mainly due to the effect of export exposure, while regions exposed to 
import competition did not differ from other regions.
44 Although the coefficient on 
differences in employment patterns only hovers around the 10 percent level of statistical 
significance, the point estimate is consistently negative.  
 
7.3 Combining individual and municipal data 
 
In Table 10, we add municipal level data to the exit poll data, thereby allowing us to combine 
the two dimensions of data. Since the exit poll was conducted in 83 out of 290 municipalities, 
we lose some of the regional variation when merging the two data sets. The exit poll stations 
were, however, chosen to be representative so it is likely that this effect is of minor 
importance.  
 
In the first specification in column (1) of Table 10, we replicate specification (3) from Table 8 
to facilitate a comparison. In the next specification, in column (2), we add a set of 
(unreported) municipal level dummies. As shown, the estimated coefficients are stable to this 
inclusion. The only exception is the variables indicating place of upbringing. This should 
come as no surprise, since this is basically a geographical indicator. More importantly, the 
                                                 
44 The results are similar when we used trade exposure measures based on trade with the entire EU, rather than the euro area 
alone.   32
socio-economic variables are unaffected when taking the geographical component into 
account. 
 
In specification (3), we add the indices for difference in employment and trade exposure. The 
results show that voters living in regions with different industrial structures compared to the 
euro area were indeed significantly more reluctant to join the monetary union, even after 
taking individual characteristics into account. The trade exposure index remains negative as 
above, but is not statistically significant in this specification. When the trade exposure index 
is replaced by the export exposure index in column (4), the negative point estimate is 
significant. Thus, the result indicating that voters in regions with high export exposure were 
relatively prone to seeing the benefits of retaining the krona appears quite robust. The results 
in specification (5), however, indicate that voters in regions exposed to import competition 
from the euro area did not differ from voters in other regions.  
 
To discuss the size of the effects, we use the estimates in column (4). As explained above, all 
categorical variables gave the probability difference of a Yes-vote between a member of one 
group relative to a member of the respective base group. A member of the LO trade union 
confederation was thus 4.3 percent less likely to vote Yes compared to a non-union member. 
Similarly, an unemployed voter was 5.6 percent less likely to do so than an employed voter, 
and a white-collar worker 13.6 percent more likely than a blue-collar worker to vote in favour 
of euro membership. Since the municipal level variables are continuous, the interpretation of 
the effect is less straight forward. However, the marginal effect of 0.76 for the export 
exposure index means that if we were to increase export exposure by 0.03 (one standard 
deviation), voters would be 2.3 percent (0.76×0.03) less likely to be in favour of membership. 
Correspondingly, increasing the difference in employment patterns by 0.01 (one standard 
deviation) would make a voter approximately 2 percent (1.96×0.01) less likely to cast a Yes-
vote. 
 
In Table 11, we introduce interaction effects between individual and municipal level 
variables. By letting individual and municipal variables interact, we are able to analyze 
whether the effect of some individual characteristics were stronger (or weaker) in certain 
types of economic environments. In all specifications, the same base set of individual control 
variables as in Table 8 are included, along with a set of municipal dummies. By including the 
latter, we control for the average municipal effect across all individuals within a municipality.   33
In Table 11, we interact individual characteristics with municipal level differences in 
employment patterns (columns (1) and (2)), and with export exposure (columns (3) and (4)). 
In columns (5) and (6), we include all interactions simultaneously. In the even numbered 
columns, the attitude variables “left wing” and “right wing”, as well as the “leave the EU” 
dummy are included. This raises the explanatory power of the regressions significantly, but is 
to some extent questionable since these attitudes themselves may be the result of more 
fundamental socio-economic (or other) developments. 
 
While most of the interaction effects are statistically insignificant, some results are highly 
interesting. First of all, in labour markets with employment patterns that differ from the euro 
area, private employees were significantly less willing to join the euro area compared to the 
average private employee. This indicates that while private employees on average were more 
willing to join the euro than municipal employees, the difference between the groups was 
smaller where the labour market is more likely to be hit by asymmetric economic shocks. 
Similarly, members of the Confederation of Professional Associations, SACO, were less 
willing to join compared to other SACO members, if they were located in labour markets 
where the employment pattern differed from the euro area. 
 
One interpretation of the result for SACO members is that they, due to their higher 
educational level, were better suited than others when it came to identifying the risks 
emerging from asymmetric shocks. A further indication of such a mechanism is that students 
in such regions also appear to have been relatively less willing to join, although this effect is 
not statistically significant. 
 
Concerning export exposure, private employees in export-exposed regions were somewhat 
more willing to join the euro compared to other private employees. The point estimate is, 
however, quite unstable and not always statistically significant. The opposite holds for self-
employed individuals who were less willing to join if they worked in regions exporting to the 
euro area. The sign of the interaction term for the other groups of entrepreneurs were also 
negative, albeit not statistically significant. These results for the different groups of 
entrepreneurs are quite a strong test for whether the benefit effect or the cost (or loss of 
insurance) effect of the euro membership dominated. When working on export-oriented 
markets, these groups are able to benefit from increased exports, but are at the same time   34
highly exposed to risks possibly related to not having a floating exchange rate. The results 
indicate that the insurance mechanism was dominant for these groups. 
 
One of the most interesting, as well as a most robust, finding is that the unemployed living in 
export-intensive regions were much more reluctant to join the euro than other unemployed 
individuals. One plausible interpretation is that the unemployed in these regions have had first 
hand experience of the sensitivity of the export sector to economic shocks stemming from the 
international economy.  
 
In the last two columns of Table 11, all interaction effects are taken into account at the same 
time. Basically, the results from columns (1) – (4) hold in these specifications. 
 
7.4 Motives behind the vote 
 
While we now have a fair idea about who voted in favour of euro membership, we do not 
know why they did so. In order to probe deeper into this question, we exploit the answers to 
seven questions in the exit poll asking the respondents to attach a weight on the importance of 
the Interest Rate, the future of the Welfare State, the Swedish Economy, the respondent’s 
Private Economy, the value of National Independence, the value of being able to Influence the 
EU, and Gender Equality. As explained above, we normalize the variables with the average 
weight across all motivational answers.
45  
 
In Tables 12a and 12b, we present OLS regressions using the answers to each of these 
normalized questions as the dependent variable. In the odd numbered columns, we only 
include the various groups, and in the even numbered columns, we include an interaction term 
between each group variable of interest and an indicator taking the value one if the respondent 
voted Yes. Thus, we do not just analyze differences between different groups, but also 
differences between the average Yes-voter and Yes-voters within each group. All regressions 
include the full set of individual control variables, individual attitude variables, and our 
measures of export exposure and the difference in employment patterns.
46  
 
                                                 
45 Again, this procedure is used to take into account the problem that some groups assigned systematically higher (or lower) 
weights to all questions asked. 
46 Using municipal dummies do not change the results for the individual level variables to any substantial degree. The same is 
true if we exclude the attitude variables left-wing, right-wing, and leave the EU.   35
7.4.1 Who believed that the interest rate was important? 
 
In Table 12a, the dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is the weight assigned by the voter 
on the Interest Rate. This variable is a crucial when trying to evaluate the bearing of the 
insurance motive on voting behaviour. It is striking that Yes-voters assigned a significantly 
lower weight to the interest rate than No-voters. This result should be expected. Voters who 
assigned a higher weight to the Interest Rate would be expected to vote No as the Swedish 
central bank can control and change this rate if Sweden were to remain outside the euro area. 
This is a strong indication that voters, on average, did indeed understand the options facing 
them in the referendum.  
 
Respondents living in regions with high export exposure and employment patterns that differ 
from that of the euro area, tended to assign a greater weight to the Interest Rate than those 
living in other regions. From an insurance perspective, this is precisely what to expect since 
the value of setting a national interest rate (having an independent domestic monetary policy) 
should be greatest in these regions. There is no systematic difference between Yes and No-
voters in these regions.  
 
Column (1) in Table 12a demonstrates that private employees on average did not assign a 
different weight to the Interest Rate than municipal employees. However, this average hides 
an interesting heterogeneity among the privately employed. Controlling for the average 
weight assigned to the Interest Rate placed by Yes-voters (column (2), we find that private 
employees who voted Yes downplayed the importance of the Interest Rate compared to the 
average Yes-voter. At the same time, private employees assigned a higher weight to the 
Interest Rate than the average voter. Since the interest rate is presumably more important for 
private employees, this – again – is an indication that voters behaved rationally when casting 
their vote. No similar heterogeneity between Yes and No-voters can be found among 
government employees. 
 
Compared to non-unionized respondents, there is evidence that members of LO and TCO 
assigned a higher weight to the Interest Rate, but there is no significant difference between 
Yes and No-voters in these groups. Among the academic professionals, the SACO members, 
however, No-voters assigned a significantly higher weight to the Interest Rate than Yes-
voters. Since the same pattern applies to students and white-collar workers, it is reasonable to   36
suspect that there are educational/informational reasons behind these patterns: more 
knowledgeable voters view the cost of giving up the capacity to set the interest rate higher 
than less well-educated voters.  
 
Unemployed respondents on average did not assign a greater weight to the Interest Rate than 
the employed. The unemployed who voted Yes did, however, consider the Interest Rate to be 
of relatively high importance. This may have been due to a belief among the unemployed that 
a Yes to the euro would imply lower interest rates compared to if Sweden stayed outside the 
euro. This was an argument used at an early stage by proponents of the single currency – 
when Swedish rates were above the euro level. The argument disappeared from the debate 
when Swedish rates dropped below the euro level, but could still have been borne in the 
minds of some voters. 
 
7.4.2 Who believed that the welfare state was important? 
 
In Table 12a, columns (3) and (4), the results from regressions estimating the relative weight 
assigned to the future of the Welfare State are reported. As mentioned earlier, the No-
campaign stressed that the euro was a threat to the Swedish model and that the euro would 
reduce the scope of the welfare state. Despite this argument being questionable from a formal 
point of view since euro-area membership does not place any restrictions on the size of the 
welfare state; it is obvious that it had some impact since Yes-voters assigned a lower weight 
to the importance of the Welfare State than No-voters.  
 
On average, voters living in regions with employment patterns that differed from the euro 
area average assigned a relatively low weight to the Welfare State. There is, however, 
considerable heterogeneity within this group. After taking out the average weight assigned to 
the Welfare State motive by Yes-voters, we see that Yes-voters in these regions assigned a 
relatively high weight to this variable compared to the average Yes-voter. No similar pattern 
is found for voters living in export-exposed regions. Among the various sub-groups, there are 
few significant results for this variable. What stands out is that SACO members who voted 
Yes assigned a relatively low weight to this motive, as did unemployed voters.  
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7.4.3 Who believed that the Swedish economy was important? 
 
In the final two columns of Table 12a, we analyze how important the development of the 
Swedish Economy was for the respondents’ decision. There is no significant difference 
between Yes and No-voters regarding this dimension. Respondents, especially No-voters, 
living in regions with employment patterns that differ from the euro area average assigned a 
lower weight to the Swedish Economy than other respondents, since they in all probability 
viewed the local economic situation as less correlated with the Swedish economy as a whole. 
 
Among the sub-groups, the unemployed assigned a relatively low weight to this variable. This 
might indicate that the unemployed considered that their private situation was weakly linked 
to the development of the Swedish economy as a whole. White-collar workers, on the other 
hand, assigned a high weight to the Swedish Economy. For the self-employed Yes-voters, the 
Swedish Economy was relatively important when they cast their votes.  
 
7.4.4 Who believed that the private economy was important? 
 
In the first two columns of Table 12b, we find that there was a tendency for voters in export-
oriented regions to assign a higher weight to their Private Economy than the average voter. 
This pattern is similar for both Yes and No-voters in these regions. This result might reflect 
the opposing effects on exporters caused by euro-area membership: on the one hand, 
membership was likely to raise exports,
47 on the other hand, exporters could benefit from the 
insurance effect offered by the floating exchange rate of the krona.  
 
Some groups of respondents assigned a lower weight to the importance of the Private 
Economy when they cast their votes. SACO members, students, white-collar workers, the self-
employed, and entrepreneurs all assigned a lower weight to this variable, in particular if they 
voted against the euro. This indicates that these groups all expected to benefit personally from 
adopting the euro.  
 
                                                 
47 See Baldwin (2006) for estimates of the trade effects of the euro. Baldwin states that the consensus view is that the euro 
has boosted intra-euro trade by five to ten percent.   38
7.4.5 Who believed that national independence was important? 
 
One of the major objections of the No-camp to adopting the euro was that Sweden would give 
up its national independence along several dimensions, ignoring the fact that some of them 
were already surrendered when Sweden became a member of the EU in 1995. The counter-
argument of the Yes-side was that Sweden would gain in influence within the EU. As seen in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 12b, Yes-voters did indeed assign a lower weight to National 
Independence when they cast their vote.  
 
Basically, the pattern of the National Independence variable mimics the pattern of the interest 
rate. This means that voters correctly perceived that the main difference between being an EU 
member and a member of the euro area was that the latter implied giving up the domestic 
monetary policy. In this light, it is interesting to see that entrepreneurs (with 1-9 employees) 
and private employees who voted Yes assigned an even lower weight to National 
Independence than the average Yes-voter. This is consistent with the hypothesis that these 
groups were highly exposed to the risks associated with losing a domestic monetary policy. 
 
7.4.6 Who believed that influence in the EU was important? 
 
One of the main arguments put forward by the Yes-campaign was that by not adopting the 
euro, Sweden’s political influence over EU policies would decrease since Sweden would be 
viewed as a disloyal and uncommitted EU member. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 12b, we 
see that Yes-voters did indeed assign a significantly higher weight to the Influence the EU 
motive than No-voters. This pattern is more pronounced among the privately employed, but is 
actually reversed for members of the LO confederation: LO members who voted Yes assigned 
a significantly lower weight to the Influence the EU variable than other Yes-voters. The 
academic SACO members assigned a higher weight to the Influence the EU variable, as did 
students, white-collar workers, and entrepreneurs.  
 
7.4.7 Who believed that gender equality was important? 
 
In the last two columns of Table 12b, we show which groups that put a higher weight on 
gender equality as a motive for casting their vote. In the referendum campaign the No-camp 
argued that euro area membership would have an adverse effect on women and gender   39
equality. The precise mechanisms behind these adverse effects were not clearly spelled out, 
but the fear that the membership would reduce the size and scope of the public sector was part 
of the argument. In column (8), we see that no-voters put a slightly higher weight on gender 
equality than yes-voters. The difference is not particularly large, suggesting that this issue was 
not important for the outcome of the election.  
 
Moving further down in Table 12b, there are few significant results. Generally speaking, 
groups with a strong labour market position (white collar workers, SACO members, private 
employees) placed a lower weight on this motive than other groups. The unemployed, on the 
other hand, found gender equality to be relatively important. There are no asymmetric effects 
between yes and no-voters within these groups, again showing that gender equality did not 
divide the Swedish electorate.  
 
7.5 Summing up the econometric evidence 
 
How do our empirical results square with the hypotheses based on the OCA approach 
suggested initially? In short, they are consistent with our priors as set out on the basis of the 
political economy of exchange rate systems. Almost all of the variables that we assumed to be 
positively/negatively associated with a Yes/No to the euro obtain the expected sign. Voters 
cast their votes as if they based their opinion on an OCA model of the functioning of the 
Swedish economy. In this sense they were rational – they had a macroeconomic model in 
their minds. Not only that, they were able to roughly assess at an individual level the costs 
and benefits of maintaining the domestic currency compared to replacing it with the euro. In 
the econometric results, the insurance motive emerges as a strong driving force behind the 
referendum outcome. We are induced to conclude that the majority of the voters voted for 
insurance, thus contributing to the No-victory.  
 
Two specific results emerge from the econometric tests. First, judging from both individual 
and municipal level data, voters financially dependent on the public sector, either through 
employment in the municipal sector or by being transfer-dependent, were relatively unwilling 
to adopt the euro. Voters in the private sector, with higher education and/or white-collar jobs 
or management positions were, on the other hand, relatively positive towards euro 
membership. These results hold even after taking the general ideological leanings of the   40
respondents into account, and after controlling for which municipality the respondents resided 
in. 
 
Second, the potential insurance value of the domestic currency, the krona, affected voters in a 
predictable way. The groups that stood to gain the most from retaining the krona as an 
insurance device were indeed relatively reluctant to adopt the euro. This is best indicated by 
the fact that voters in regions with high trade exposure, especially high export exposure, were 
significantly more negative towards euro membership.  
 
The same holds for voters living in regions with employment patterns that differ substantially 
from those of the euro area. Since these regions run a higher risk of being subject to 
asymmetric shocks than other regions, this again highlights the relative importance of the 
insurance motive for voting behaviour. The influence of regional employment patterns on 
voting behaviour was especially strong for voters employed in the private sector. The effect of 
high export exposure was particularly strong among the unemployed and the self-employed. 
All in all, these results are highly suggestive of an insurance motive driving voting behaviour: 
voters exposed to asymmetric macroeconomic risks were relatively unwilling to join the euro, 
and voters in export exposed regions valued the insurance derived from a flexible exchange 
rate higher than the positive trade effects expected from joining the euro. 
 
Turning to the motives behind the voting behaviour, it is clear that voters on average had a 
fairly good grasp of what the referendum was all about; a good grasp in the sense that they 
were responding in line with the OCA-approach. Yes-voters assigned a relatively low weight 
to the importance of the interest rate, the value of being independent, and the welfare state. In 
turn, No-voters assigned a relatively low weight to the value of being able to influence the 
EU. There were no significant differences between Yes and No-voters in how they valued the 
Swedish economy or their private economy when they cast their vote.  
 
The importance of the insurance (cost) motive also emerges from the analysis of voter 
motives. Among other things, voters living in regions exposed to exports and with 
employment patterns different from the euro area tended to assign a high weight to the 
interest rate and independence. In addition, privately employed Yes-voters, who presumably 
are more exposed to asymmetric shocks than publicly employed voters, assigned a lower 
value to the importance of the interest rate than the average Yes-voter.    41
 
As stated above, the econometric results are consistent with the view that the voters held an 
OCA-model in their minds. Now the question emerges: Did the voters hold the "correct" 
model of the effects of rejecting the krona and adopting the euro? The model of the voters 
was based on the original Mundell (1961) view of the trade-off between efficiency and 
insurance when entering a monetary union. Today, however, the economics profession has 
moved away from the original OCA view as a result of new research and new developments. 
Thus, we do not suggest that the traditional OCA approach necessarily gave the voters in 
2003 the "correct" model of the effects of entering the euro area. It is enough for the purpose 
of our econometric study to conclude that it provided the voters with a macroeconomic model 
on which they based their voting judging from our results.  
 
 
8. Comparisons with other studies  
 
As far as we know, our set of tests regarding the outcome of the Swedish euro referendum is 
the only one based on a consistent application of the political economy of exchange rate 
regime choice. For this reason, it is of interest to compare our results with studies on the 
views of the public towards the euro and European integration adopting alternative 
methodologies. To what extent are our findings identical to or different from those established 
in earlier studies? We turn to this question by considering the evidence from the following 
areas of research; first, studies of the Swedish euro referendum – this is a prime benchmark 
for our conclusions – second, the record from other EU-related referenda, third, the evidence 
on public attitudes towards the euro and towards European integration.  
 
 
8.1 Evidence from the euro referendum of 2003 
 
Political scientists have examined the outcome of the Swedish euro referendum in several 
reports. The contributions in Oscarsson and Holmberg (2004a) give the most extensive 
overview. They are mainly based on tabular presentations of data and regression analyses, 
commonly focusing on the effect on the election outcome of only one factor, such as the 
impact of ideology, EU knowledge, nationalism, and regional affiliation. The discussion is 
framed in standard political science theories and models. There is no chapter on econometric   42
tests based on an explicit economic framework to account for differences in voting behaviour 
among individuals, nor is the election result discussed by adopting the political economy 
approach we use. The OCA theory, so prominent in the economic analysis and in the public 
debate prior to the election of 2003, is not mentioned explicitly in any of the contributions.
48 
 
The empirical evidence is primarily based on the pooling of two major opinion polls, one 
made in 2002 before the referendum and one after the referendum in 2003 
(Valundersökningen 2002 and Folkomröstningsundersökningen 2002) by Statistics Sweden in 
cooperation with the Department of Political Science at Göteborg University. In many ways 
this is a richer data set than the one available from the exit polls. However, it suffers from one 
major drawback; it does not reveal the choice of the voters as expressed on the actual day of 
the act of voting. Thus, the data from the exit polls are not exploited as they are in our study.  
 
Surveying the referendum polls, Oscarsson (2004a, p. 278) demonstrates that support for the 
euro is strongest among groups characterized by a high income, higher education, strong 
employment protection, full-time employment, good health, good command of foreign 
languages, and frequent travelling, particularly to countries in the euro area. Roughly the 
opposite holds for groups that reject the euro. They are at the other end of the social spectrum: 
have a low income, low level of education, are unemployed, part-time workers, more are on 
sick leave, they have less knowledge of foreign languages and travel less frequently outside 
Sweden.  
 
A centre-periphery model is explored where a voter in the periphery – i.e. a No-voter - has the 
following characteristics: a woman, working class, low/medium level of education, low 
income, living in the North and in the country side/a small village. A voter in the centre – i.e. 
a Yes-voter - is a man, middle class, higher education, high income, living in a town or major 
city in Southern Sweden. The closer you move towards the centre, the greater the likelihood 
that you would vote for the euro. The gender gap is persistent, regardless of the use of various 
control variables. The dividing line between private employment and employment in the 
public sector is a clear one. In addition, within the public sector, voters employed by local 
authorities are more critical towards the euro than voters employed by central government. 
                                                 
48 For example there is no reference to the work of Robert Mundell or other economists on the OCA-approach in any of the 
contributions in Oscarsson and Holmberg (2004a).   43
Oscarsson concludes that differences according to class, regions and gender are the three most 
powerful determinants in a political-sociological model for explaining voting behaviour.
49 
 
Oscarsson has access to data on income and education, which are not directly available in the 
exit polls. His empirical work demonstrates that these variables enter with the signs expected 
from the OCA approach. There is a positive relationship between income and education and 
support for the euro. Using proxy measures for income and education, we arrive at the same 
result.  
 
Border effects: Exploring the role of the socio-economic composition of the electorate, 
Martinson (2004) carries out a counter-factual analysis by asking the question: what would 
the outcome of the referendum have been if all of Sweden had had the same social and 
economic profile as Stockholm? Most likely, it would have given rise to a victory for the Yes-
camp. Still, sizeable regional differences would exist in the sense that Southern Sweden 
would have been more in favour of the euro than Northern Sweden. This more positive 
attitude to the single currency can be ascribed to a border effect, as discussed by Gabel 
(1998a). People in Southern Sweden, in particular in the southernmost province of Skåne, 
experience more contact with European neighbours in their daily lives than those living in the 
inland part of Northern Sweden. They travel more frequently to EU countries and they are 
more accustomed to the euro. Here Haparanda, placed on the immediate border with Finland 
in northernmost Sweden and voting for the euro, serves as another illustration of the border 
effect.  
 
Ideology and political attitudes: The role of ideology is examined in detail by Oscarsson 
(2004b). His starting point is that there is a stronger relationship between the attitudes towards 
the EU and ideology in Sweden than in any other EU Member State. Voters to the left tend to 
reject Swedish involvement in European integration while voters to the right are in favour of 
it. In a multivariate econometric analysis, Oscarsson finds that the left-right dimension is a 
major determinant of the voters' choice. The same holds for attitudes towards 
internationalism, nationalism, gender equality and the environment. Voters with an 
international outlook tend to support the euro while voters eager to protect Swedish values 
and who display national pride are in favour of the krona. Similarly, voters who stress 
                                                 
49 Oscarsson (2004a, p. 277) notes that roughly the same group of voters who opposed Swedish membership of the EU in the 
referendum of 1994 and rejected nuclear power in the referendum of 1980 voted No to the euro in the referendum of 2003.    44
equality between men and women and have sympathies with the environmental party (the 
Green Party) tend to reject the euro.  
 
The basic result of Oscarsson’s calculations is that the choice of the exchange rate regime is 
strongly influenced by political attitudes. Similar results emerge from international studies as 
summarized in Tables 1-4 as well as in our estimates. Still, the question remains: to what 
extent are political attitudes the outcome of economic considerations and conditions? Given, 
for example, a high income, financial wealth, and full-time employment in the private sector, 
the incentives for a voter to adopt a conservative or liberal political outlook are large. 
 
In an attempt to find out why the euro divides the Swedish electorate, Oskarson (2004), by 
building on the results reported in Oscarsson (2004b), carried out a number of tests in the 
spirit of Gabel (1998a). She concludes that the political divide is most likely due to 
differences in confidence and beliefs concerning the EU and the effects of the euro. She finds 
the standard differences in attitudes related to gender, education, class, income, urban/rural 
and regional affiliation without making any attempt to relate them to a consistent economic 
explanation.  
 
Knowledge about the EU: In the evening of the day of the referendum, Margot Wallström, EU 
Commissioner from Sweden, argued that "the fear of the unknown was greater than we had 
thought", suggesting that the No-victory was due to inadequate knowledge about the 
European integration process. Oscarsson (2004c) examines this view by exploring the 
differences among voters with regard to their knowledge about the EU. Knowledge is 
measured using the replies to a set of eleven questions dealing with the EU, the euro, elections 
to the European Parliament, macroeconomic conditions in the EU, and the ECB.  
 
Summarizing the replies into five classes of EU knowledge, Oscarsson found systematic and 
significant differences. In short, individuals with low levels of EU knowledge tended to vote 
No to the euro while individuals with high levels supported the introduction of the euro in 
Sweden. In addition, women were overrepresented in the categories with low levels of EU 
knowledge. Similar differences were also found in knowledge about other issues related to 
Swedish political life. A positive relationship between support for the euro and general 
political knowledge emerges. Oscarsson (2004c, p. 382) concludes that "better factual 
knowledge about the EU among the voters would have taken the victory from the No-side".    45
 
The role of economic factors: Economic determinants or forces are assigned an important role 
behind the decision of the voters in several of the contributions in the Oscarsson and 
Holmberg volume (2004a). However, this is not done in a systematic way. In a chapter 
entitled "It's the Economy, Stupid", Holmberg (2004b) is close to our work in spirit. Although 
he performs no formal tests of a model, Holmberg stresses the role of economic 
considerations driving the decision of the voters, arguing that economics was more important 
than in a traditional Swedish general election. More specifically, he finds that voters with a 
positive view of the past and future performance of their private economic situation as well as 
of the Swedish economy were more prone, by 15 percentage points, to vote Yes than voters 
with a negative view. To Holmberg this is an expected outcome as the euro referendum dealt 
with "economics and money".  
 
In their concluding chapter, Oscarsson and Holmberg (2004b) emphasize economic 
considerations as a main determinant of the outcome of the referendum. As demonstrated 
above, the results reported in their volume display great similarities with ours when focusing 
on identical variables.  
 
As discussed earlier, the referendum on euro adoption in Denmark in 2000 differed from the 
euro referendum in Sweden 2003 in the sense that the Danish electorate faced a choice 
between a fixed exchange rate between the domestic currency and the euro and euro 
membership, while the Swedish electorate had to make a decision between a flexible 
exchange rate for the domestic currency and euro membership. Starting from exit poll data, 
Jupille and Leblang (2007) examine the impact of a number of explanatory factors on the 
referendum outcome in both countries. They find some striking differences between Denmark 
and Sweden. The Danish referendum was primarily determined by attitudes towards European 
integration, more so than by economic variables as in the Swedish referendum. This should 
have been an expected outcome because the Danish voters were confronted with less of a real 
choice between alternative exchange rate regimes than the Swedish voters. When as in 
Denmark the referendum concerned primarily the name of the domestic currency unit, krone 
or euro, private and aggregate economic considerations are likely to play a minor role. 
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8.2 Evidence from EU referenda 
 
As stated initially, the Swedish referendum on the euro in 2003 is a unique event in the sense 
that it dealt solely with one clear issue, the choice of exchange rate regime. Still, comparisons 
of the Swedish euro referendum with referenda on EU and EMU membership are fruitful as 
these dealt with European integration as well.  
 
The referenda in Finland, Sweden and Norway on membership in the EU, which took place 
one after the other in the autumn of 1994, have been analyzed in great detail by a group of 
political scientists in a joint Nordic project. The voting behaviour in the three Nordic 
countries was almost identical, according to Jensen, Gilljam and Pesonen (1998, p. 316), “The 
more wealth, education, and prestige a voter possessed, the more likely she or he was to 
support EU membership. People in urban and suburban areas were more likely to support 
membership than people in rural and sparsely populated areas.” Voters in the capital or in its 
surroundings were more in favour of the EU than voters in the periphery. Men appreciated EU 
membership more than women. Roughly the same pattern holds for the euro referendum nine 
years later in Sweden.  
 
The discussion by Jensen, Gilljam and Pesonen (1998) and their collaborators is based on 
cross-tabulations and regressions without any explicit tests founded on predictions derived 
from economic theory. It is tempting to conclude that their work could be improved by tying 
it closer to the theory of exchange rate regime choice, since the patterns they reveal are close 
to those suggested by the OCA approach. 
 
Examining regional variations in the referendum on EU membership in Sweden in 1994, 
Vlachos (2004) suggests that the referendum represented a choice between two different fiscal 
regimes. EU membership would limit the room for manoeuvre of national policy-making. 
According to Vlachos (2004, p. 1590), it would be identical to “a fiscal regime imposing strict 
restrictions on the national discretion to handle risk-sharing and redistribution between 
regions.” Staying outside the EU would allow more leeway for domestic insurance through 
the public sector via taxes, transfers and subsidies, and thus for more redistribution. He 
predicted that rich regions with a diversified industrial structure would vote for EU 
membership, while regions receiving high transfers would vote against. In line with these 
expectations – and consistent with the main results in this report – he found that regions with   47
high average income and educational levels, small receipts of central government transfers, 
and a well-diversified industrial structure were relatively positive to membership.  
 
Since Vlachos analyses the referendum of 1994 as a choice between two types of fiscal 
regimes, thus focusing on the costs and benefits of a “tighter” versus a more “generous” 
redistribution policy, he makes no explicit reference to the predictions generated by the 
literature on the political economy of exchange rate regimes. However, these predictions are 
similar to those he derives. In his opinion, the Yes-victory in the EU referendum could be 
interpreted as a vote in support of reducing the size of the Swedish welfare state rather than a 
vote favouring European political integration. 
 
The voting behaviour in the Danish 2000 EMU referendum, which dealt with a choice 
between adopting the euro or maintaining a fixed exchange rate between the Danish currency 
and the euro, is close to the pattern found for Sweden in the 2003 euro referendum in many 
respects. According to Marcussen and Zölner (2003, p. 117) “a No-voter is more likely to 
have a lower education than a Yes-voter, to have a job at the bottom end of the social 
hierarchy, and to be female.” However, in Denmark, the No-voters were found at both ends of 
the political spectrum: either on the far left or the far right, while the Yes-voters clustered in 
the political centre. Sweden, in contrast to Denmark, had no populist party to the far right 
during the euro referendum.
50 Nor did Marcussen and Zölner report any differences in voting 
behaviour according to region, education or occupational group. Here the Swedish pattern is 
markedly more segmented.  
 
In a study of the support for EU membership in the candidate countries, Doyle and Fidrmuc 
(2003) note that the impact of economic integration diverges across segments in society. For 
this reason they expect to find differences in the voting behaviour of different socio-economic 
groups. However, they are not ready to predict the effects of various determinants on voting 
behaviour. Instead they regress support for EU membership and voters’ participation in the 
referenda on a large number of variables such as sex, age, household size, education, 
unemployment, income and employment in a search for common patterns. They find that 
among voters “those with high education (or still in school), white-collar occupations, high 
income, young age and living in urban areas are more likely to participate in the accession 
                                                 
50 See Martinsson (2004).    48
referenda and vote in favour of EU membership.” To their surprise, “the elderly, blue-collar 
workers, less educated, those with a repeated history of unemployment, those living in rural 
areas and also those living in underdeveloped or agricultural regions tend to be against 
accession and/or do not vote.” Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003, p. 20) are puzzled by this result 
because they expected these groups to benefit from the redistribution opportunities provided 
by EU membership.  
 
In a study of the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Meon (2002), partially 
inspired by the OCA approach, demonstrates that voters’ perceptions of the economic costs 
and benefits of a monetary union influenced voting behaviour. Using the economic 
characteristics of the French regions (départements), he concludes that regions with high 
unemployment tended to vote No to the Treaty. However, he does not find evidence that the 
degree of openness to international trade across regions in France had any impact on the 
voters’ choice.  
 
A comparison between the Swedish euro referendum and other EU referenda as surveyed here 
suggests that roughly the same forces were at work in most of them. Voters high in the social 
hierarchy are relatively supportive of the European integration process while voters lower in 
social ranking are sceptical towards integration.  
8.3 Studies of attitudes towards the euro and European integration 
 
We have previously summarized the empirical evidence on public attitudes towards the single 
currency and towards European integration in Table 1-4. These tables demonstrate that a 
limited set of explanatory variables emerges as statistically significant across European 
countries such as income, wealth, education, employment, gender, ideology, proximity to 
border, national identity, and the macroeconomic history and conditions of the domestic 
economy.  
 
Our work on the Swedish euro referendum is consistent with the results reported in Table 1-
4.
51 Our study adds some aspects. It stresses the importance of a number of sectoral divides in 
Sweden such as private versus public employment. Voters employed in the public sector were 
                                                 
51 These results reject the view of Giovannini (1993, p. 18) “These observations lead me to the central thesis of this paper: 
there are no stable or significant constituencies for or against monetary union.” The empirical evidence considered in our 
report suggests the existence of a number of fairly well-defined groups that are differ in their attitudes towards monetary 
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relatively critical of the single currency. The opposite holds for voters employed outside the 
public sector. The characteristics of the economic situation at the municipal level are 
important determinants as well. The insurance motive emerges as a highly crucial argument 
for the decision on the day of the vote.  
 
 
9. The choice of the exchange rate regime in a comparative context 
 
Monetary history demonstrates that the acceptance and popularity of a currency is closely 
associated with the public’s trust in the institutions that supply the currency such as the 
central bank, the parliament, the government and other elements of the political system.
52 In 
an old established nation state like Sweden with the Riksbank as the oldest central bank in the 
world, this trust and legitimacy has been built up and has existed for a long time. The 
traditional functions of the domestic money, the krona, as a medium of exchange, a unit of 
account and a store of value, have usually been self-evident although the frequent 
devaluations in the 1970s and 1980s and the financial crisis of the early 1990s reduced trust in 
the krona. 
 
Given this background, to replace the krona with the euro represents to the Swedish public a 
radical break with tradition. The new European currency needs a high degree of credibility 
and trust before it can be fully accepted as a substitute. However, as demonstrated by Chart 5, 
the Swedish public had little trust in the euro in the year of the referendum compared to other 
EU Member States.
53 Representative samples of the public were first asked to give their view 
on the European Commission and later asked about their attitudes towards the euro. The 
question about the European Commission was phrased as follows: “Please tell me if you tend 
to trust or tend not to trust it?” The question about “A European monetary union with one 
single currency, the euro” was phrased as “Please tell me whether you are for it or against?”  
 
According to Chart 5, the poll for the United Kingdom displays the lowest degree of trust in 
the European Commission. It is also low in Sweden and Denmark. The fact that these three 
countries have all remained outside the euro area is related to their low level of trust in 
                                                 
52 For a brief discussion of “trust”, see Cohen (1998). The concept is close to that of credibility underlying much of the 
analysis of modern monetary theory and policy.  
53 The data for Chart 5 is obtained from the Eurobarometer conducted in the spring of 2003, prior to the referendum in 
Sweden in September 2003.   50
“Brussels” and “Frankfurt”. A simple regression using trust in the European Commission as 
the explanatory variable behind the Yes to the euro – see Chart 5 – brings out a strong 
positive relationship across the Member States of the EU.
54 Countries such as Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain are at the opposite end of the scale from the 
United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.  
 
History may explain the pattern in Chart 5. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark – all 
monarchies and stable democracies – have been independent nation states for long periods of 
time. The three countries have not experienced domestic political violence for centuries. 
Sweden and the United Kingdom have not been occupied by foreign powers in modern times. 
Denmark only experienced foreign occupation during World War II. Their domestic political 
systems enjoy considerable public respect and support. Denmark and Sweden have a well-
developed sense of national identity based on a common language and a common religion, a 
relatively homogenous culture, respected political institutions and a long history of national 
independence.
55 Sweden has not been involved in a war for almost two centuries, contributing 
to both an attitude of isolationism and a common belief that Swedish society is a unique 
construction.
56 The late entry of Sweden into the EU in 1995 is a consequence of this 
sceptical and isolationist attitude towards the European integration process. 
 
Looking at European integration from such a domestic perspective, the institutions of 
European cooperation, and thus the euro, appear less credible than is the case in EU Member 
States where confidence and trust in domestic institutions is lower than in Sweden. This 
relative lack of trust in EU institutions compared to domestic institutions is likely to have 
influenced the outcome of the Swedish euro referendum. This conclusion is supported by the 
findings concerning voter attitudes within Sweden; voters sceptical of European integration 
tended to reject the euro. Similarly, voters positive towards the EU, commonly wanted to 
adopt the euro.  
 
 
                                                 
54 The high correlation between trust in the European Commission and acceptance of the euro may also be viewed as caused 
by a third factor: a positive attitude towards the European integration process, which is transformed into trust in the 
institutions of the EU including the euro. 
55 See Marcussen and Zölner (2003) and Östergård (1994) for the history and characteristics of the process of nation-building 
in Denmark. Stråth (2000) describes the Swedish path to national identity. 
56 The experience of Switzerland is similar to that of Sweden, contributing to Swiss isolationism vis-à-vis the EU.   51
10. Concluding discussion 
 
The Swedish referendum on the euro in September 2003 is an exceptional event for 
researchers of monetary unions. Voters chose between maintaining the domestic currency, the 
krona, and replacing the krona with the euro, the single currency of the European Union. For 
the first time in any country, voters had a clear choice between the two polar cases of 
exchange rate regimes: either a freely floating exchange rate or membership in a monetary 
union. The referendum revealed significant differences in voting behaviour across the 
electorate. Dividing lines between Yes and No-voters emerged in areas such as income, 
education, sex, employment, geographical location and industrial structure.  
 
The aim of our empirical study is to provide an explanation for the major differences in voting 
behaviour. We start from the optimum currency area (OCA) approach as it was presented to 
the Swedish public in the Calmfors Commission Report of 1996. This report and the 
subsequent debate leading up to the referendum were based on the original Mundell (1961) 
view of the trade-off between efficiency, thus increasing trade and income, by entering a 
monetary union, and obtaining macroeconomic insurance by retaining a domestic currency 
with a flexible exchange rate. Eventually, the public adopted this OCA model as the analytical 
framework for the referendum. Consequently, it determined voting behaviour and the 
outcome of the referendum.  
 
The OCA approach allows us to generate a set of hypotheses concerning voting behaviour 
that are explored in our econometric tests based on exit polls covering more than 10,000 
voters on the day of the referendum. We suggest that the OCA trade-off was perceived 
differently across segments of voters depending on their evaluations of the risks of and 
income gains from adopting the euro compared maintaining the krona. We thus merge the 
OCA approach with an account of the distributional effects of the choice of the exchange rate 
system as these effects were perceived by voters.  
 
The OCA trade-off is well illustrated by the effects of export exposure on voting behaviour. 
Voters in export-oriented regions stand the most to gain from the increased exports brought 
about by reduced transaction costs if Sweden were to enter the euro area. At the same time, 
the same voters potentially stand to gain substantially from a flexible exchange rate that offers   52
insurance against both domestic and international economic shocks. It is a matter for the 
empirical analysis to reveal which effect will dominate.  
 
A first major empirical finding of our study is that high export exposure was significantly 
related to the propensity to vote against  euro membership. Thus, the insurance value of 
keeping the flexible exchange rate and thus the domestic currency was deemed more 
important by voters in export-oriented regions than the prospect of reducing transaction costs 
and increasing international trade by entering the euro area.  
 
A related result demonstrates that voters living in regions with employment patterns that 
differ substantially from that of the euro area were relatively negative towards the euro. Since 
these regions run a higher risk of being subject to asymmetric shocks than other regions, this 
again highlights the relative importance of the insurance motive for voting behaviour. The 
fact that this result was especially strong for voters employed in the private sector, which is 
prone to be hit harder by such shocks than the public sector, is corroborating evidence of the 
role of the insurance mechanism. Recently Mayda et al (2007) have found that risk aversion is 
strongly related to anti-trade attitudes but that this effect is weaker in countries with a 
generous welfare state. Our results thus confirm the importance of the insurance motive in 
determining voter attitudes in the realm of international economic policy.  
 
A second major result is well in line with the empirical findings of other EU-related 
referenda: voters financially dependent on the public sector, either by being employed by the 
public sector or by being transfer-dependent, were relatively unwilling to join the euro. On the 
other hand, voters in the private sector, with high levels of education and/or white-collar jobs 
or management positions were relatively positive towards euro membership.  
 
These results can also be explained within the OCA framework. Voters with high levels of 
human capital and income are expected to benefit more from the increased economic 
integration brought about by euro membership than voters with a low level of education and 
low income. At the same time, these groups have substantial private "labour market 
insurance" and private financial insurance in their relatively transferable human capital and 
higher income and wealth.  
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The strong effect of being financially dependent on the public sector on voting behaviour may 
appear puzzling as a Swedish euro membership would not imply any formal or binding 
restrictions on the size of the public sector, on the level of public employment, on the size of 
taxation or on the extent of transfer payments. Here the No-camp was most successful in 
presenting the euro, the single currency, as a threat to the Swedish welfare state.  
 
Our analysis of the arguments used by the voters in the exit poll to account for their decisions 
to vote Yes or No shows that voters who were in favour of adopting the euro, thus voting Yes, 
systematically assigned a lower weight to the value of an independent interest rate (and thus 
to a domestic central bank with the power to set a national interest rate for Sweden) as a 
motive for casting their vote than the No-voters who were against the euro. In addition, Yes-
voters in two groups likely to be negatively affected by asymmetric shocks, private employees 
and entrepreneurs, assigned an even lower weight to the interest rate as a motive for their vote 
than the average Yes-voter.  
 
At a general level, the econometric results suggest that the traditional OCA approach ha 
strong predictive power for the differences in voting behaviour across the electorate in the 
euro referendum. Voters were capable of making rational comparisons of the costs and 
benefits of adopting the euro and voted accordingly.
57 Voters apparently asked themselves: 
the euro – what's in it for me? On the day of the referendum, they replied to this question by 
voting as if they had a traditional OCA model in their mind covering the complexity of the 
economic issues raised during the run-up to the referendum. This should not come as a 
surprise since the public debate on the economic costs and benefits of the euro and the krona 
preceding the referendum was based on the traditional OCA approach.  
 
Actually, the voters on September 13th, 2003 took a step further than the academic 
economists in charge of preparing the Government Reports on Sweden and the EMU 
published in 1996 and 2002. The economists focused on the OCA trade-off between 
microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stabilization. The voters added a new and to 
them missing dimension in the analysis of euro area membership: the distributional 
consequences of the choice of the exchange rate system. To sum up, our empirical results 
                                                 
57 The predictive power of the OCA approach to assess the creation and destruction of monetary unions is commonly 
regarded as low. See for example Goodhart (1995, p. 452) and Bordo and Jonung (2003, pp. 62-63). However, in this study 
dealing with the differential impact across groups in society of the choice of exchange rate regime, the traditional OCA 
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suggest that the distributional effects of the krona and the euro as perceived by the voters 
account for the large differences in voting behaviour across the Swedish electorate.  
 
We do not consider if the voters held the correct or proper model of the effects of adopting the 
euro and rejecting the krona. This important issue is beyond the scope of our study. In our 
econometric work, we start from the original OCA model of Mundell (1961), today 
sometimes labelled Mundell I, because this approach was adopted by the economics 
profession and presented to the electorate as the proper analytical framework to understand 
the benefits and costs of monetary unification. It thus influenced voting behaviour in the 
referendum in 2003.  
 
New research and new developments have induced the economics profession to move away 
from the original OCA view. In particular, a recent strand of empirical research suggests that 
monetary unification contributes to financial integration, which increases risk-sharing and 
consumption smoothing within a monetary union.
58 The roots of the work on risk-sharing in 
monetary unions can be traced back to a contribution by Mundell (1973), sometimes 
classified as Mundell II. Thus the original trade-off between efficiency and stabilization in 
Mundell I tends to evaporate in Mundell II. In case a new euro referendum takes place in 
Sweden in the future, the arguments of the Yes and No camp are likely to be revised 
significantly given these findings about the financial effects of monetary unions. Thus, we do 
not suggest that the traditional OCA approach necessarily gave the voters in 2003 the 
"correct" model of the consequences of entering the euro area. It is enough for the purpose of 
our econometric study to conclude that it provided the voters with a macroeconomic model to 
base their votes on.  
 
In addition to economic incentives, non-economic factors, most prominently political attitudes 
and ideology, influenced the voters as well.
59 Yes-voters were positive towards increased 
European political integration. Yes-voters wanted Sweden to have stronger political influence 
within the EU. Many of them expressed support for the idea of a United States of Europe. On 
the other hand, No-voters saw the euro as a threat to national independence, Swedish 
                                                 
58 The study by Asdrubali, Sörensen and Yosha (1996) is commonly viewed as the starting point for empirical work on risk-
sharing between US states and EU countries. 
59 True, political integration and national sovereignty is explicitly mentioned by Mundell (1961) in his seminal contribution 
as determinants of currency arrangements. He suggests that these factors might not be as strong in Western Europe due to the 
creation of the Common Market. The Swedish euro referendum indicates, however, that such factors are still decisive.    55
democracy and the Swedish way of life. They feared that joining the euro meant that 
decisions of major importance were taken out of the hands of domestic voters and domestic 
politicians and transferred to Frankfurt and Brussels to be made by policy-makers that were 
not democratically accountable according to their view. The further to the left, the stronger 
the No-vote. Only the two parties to the right, the Liberal and Conservative Parties, had a 
majority of Yes-votes. However, since voters to the left also tend to be low-income earners 
and more dependent on public transfers than voters to the right, it is difficult to disentangle 
the effect of politics and ideology from that of economic factors. The ideological stand of a 
voter is to a considerable extent due to his or her economic position in society. 
 
Finally, the decisions by the Swedish voters in the referendum of 2003 appear to a large 
extent to be governed by the same determinants that have emerged as significant in studies of 
public attitudes towards the euro and European integration in other EU countries. Roughly 
identical economic and non-economic forces concerning the euro are at play all over Europe. 
Sweden is thus no exception except in allowing its citizens a unique referendum between the 
national currency and the single European currency.   56
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Table 1. Determinants of public opinion towards the euro. A stylized summary of empirical 
results concerning individual characteristics. 
 
 



























Gabel (1998a), Scheve 
(2000) 
Education/ 
human capital  
Well-educated  Low educated  Carey (2002), Banducci 
et al (2003) 
Private/public  
sector  
Private   Public  Gabel (2001) 
Employed/ 
unemployed 
Employed  Unemployed  Gabel (2001), Carey 
(2002) 
Men/women  Men  Women  Carey (2002), Banducci 
et al (2003) 
Border effects 
 
Close to border  Far from border  Gabel (2001) 
National identity  Weak national identity  Strong national 
identity 
Gabel (1998a), Carey 
(2002), Gabel and Hix 
(2005)
(1) Müller and -
Peters 1998) 
Assessment of the 
future private 
economic situation 




Comments: The table covers empirical studies of the determinants of support for the euro 
reporting statistically significant results for the explanatory variables. Almost all the studies 
are based on Eurobarometer data. 
 
(1) Gabel and Hix (2005) find that there is no relationship between national pride and support 
for the euro in the United Kingdom. However, national identity has a significant negative 
effect on support for the euro. 
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Table 2. Determinants of public opinion towards the euro. A stylized summary of empirical 
results concerning country characteristics.  
 















Assessment of the 
future national 
economic situation 
Positive   Negative  Carey (2002) 







Banducci et al (2003) 
Domestic fiscal 
policy 














Gärtner (1997), Gabel (2001) 
Expected austerity 
measures 






Banducci et al (2003) 
Domestic inflation 
rate 
High domestic inflation  Low domestic 
inflation 
Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993), Banducci et al 
(2003), Kaltenthaler and 
Anderson (2001) 
Trade openness  More involved in EU-
trade 
Less involved in 
EU-trade 
Gabel (1997), Gärtner 
(1997), Kaltenthaler and 
Anderson (2001) 
Unemployment High  unemployment  Low 
unemployment 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(2001) 
Independence of the 
domestic central 
bank 
Less independence  More 
independence 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(2001) 
Length of 
membership in the 
EU/EMS 
Long membership  Short 
membership 
Gabel (1997), Kaltenthaler 
and Anderson (2001) 
 
Comments: The table covers empirical studies of variables where statistically significant 
results are reported.  
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Table 3. Determinants of public opinion towards European integration. A stylized summary of 
empirical results concerning individual characteristics. 
 





individuals or groups of 
individuals) 
Tend to support  
integration 












Gabel and Palmer (1995), 
Gabel (1998a and b), Carey 
(2002) 
Education/ 
human capital  
Well-educated  Low educated  Gabel and Palmer (1995), 
Gabel (1998b), Karp and 




Men   Women  Gabel (1998b), Carey 




Employed  Unemployed  Gabel and Palmer (1995), 




Right Left  Gabel  (1998b) 
Border effects 
 
Close to border  Far from border  Gabel and Palmer (1995), 
Gabel (1998a and b) 
International/ 
national outlook 
International   National   
National identity/ national 
pride 
 
Weak Strong  Carey  (2002)
(1) 
National economic benefit/, 








Gabel and Palmer (1995), 
Carey (2002), Karp and 
Bowler (2006) 
Peace and security 
(Relative national suffering 
during WW II) 
Countries suffering 




during WW II  
Gabel and Palmer (1995) 
 
Comments: The table covers empirical studies of variables where statistically significant results 
are reported. 
 
(1) Carey (2002) uses three different measures of "national pride", stressing the difficulty of 
finding good measures of this concept.  
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Table 4. Determinants of public opinion towards European integration. A stylized summary of 
empirical results concerning country characteristics. 
 







Tend to support  
integration  





Weak national identity   Strong national 
identity/pride 
Gabel (1998), Carey (2002), 
Gabel and Hix (2005); 
Müller and -Peters 1998);  







Banducci et al (2003) 
Domestic fiscal 
policy 














Gärtner (1997), Gabel (2001) 
Domestic inflation 
rate 
High domestic inflation  Low domestic 
inflation 
Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993), Banducci et al 
(2003), Kaltenthaler and 
Anderson (2001) 
Trade openness 
towards the EU 
More involved in EU-
trade 
Less involved in 
EU-trade 
Gabel (1997), Kaltenthaler 
and Anderson (2001) 
Unemployment High  unemployment  Low 
unemployment 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(2001) 
Independence of the 
domestic central 
bank 
Less independence  More 
independence 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(2001) 
Length of 
membership in the 
EU/EMS 
Long membership  Short 
membership 
Gabel (1997), Kaltenthaler 








Comments: The table covers empirical studies of variables where statistically significant 
results are reported. 
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T-test of  
no-yes diff 
       
Yes  10593  0.46     
Woman  10446  0.51 0.57 0.44  12.34 
Age  10248  0.44 0.43 0.44 4.41 
Swedish  citizen  10572  0.96 0.97 0.95 5.67 
Parent  foreign  10732  0.12 0.10 0.15 6.92 
LO  10248  0.26 0.32 0.19  15.12 
TCO  10248  0.18 0.17 0.20 2.88 
SACO  10248  0.13 0.11 0.16 8.37 
Non  union  10248  0.43 0.40 0.45 5.01 
Employed  10284  0.64 0.61 0.67 6.16 
Unemployed  10284  0.06 0.07 0.05 5.32 
Retired  age  10284  0.13 0.12 0.13 0.80 
Retired  early  10284  0.04 0.05 0.03 4.78 
Home-worker  10284  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.34 
Student  10284  0.13 0.14 0.12 3.33 
Blue-collar  10106  0.39 0.49 0.27  23.31 
White-collar  10106  0.48 0.39 0.58  19.79 
Farmer  10106  0.01 0.01 0.01 2.18 
Self  employed  10106  0.04 0.03 0.05 4.13 
Entrepreneur  (1-9) 10106  0.03 0.02 0.04 5.24 
Entrepreneur  (10+)  10106  0.01 0.01 0.01 2.83 
Municipal  empl.  10038  0.31 0.36 0.25 12.1 
Government  empl. 10038  0.13 0.13 0.14 1.82 
Private  empl.  10038  0.51 0.46 0.57  11.20 
Left  wing  10333  0.37 0.46 0.26  22.14 
Right  wing  10333  0.31 0.18 0.46  31.04 
blankvote2002  9808 0.03 0.04 0.02 6.73 
didnotvote2002  9808 0.04 0.05 0.03 5.80 
Leave  EU  10567  0.24 0.41 0.03  54.56 
Stay  in  EU  10567  0.60 0.35 0.90  72.00 
Trust politicians  10543  0.56 0.44 0.70  28.18 
Why:  Swedish  economy  8486 1.12 1.10 1.14 9.64 
Why:  welfare  8486 1.07 1.10 1.04  14.13 
Why:  influence  8486 1.00 0.87 1.15  48.86 
Why:  interest  rate  8486 0.96 1.09 0.81  50.76 
Why:gender  equality  8486 0.92 0.95 0.88  11.52 
Why:  independence  8486 0.99 1.10 0.87  45.44 
Why:  private  economy  8486 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.76 
Data is from the exit poll, Vallokalsundersökning, conducted by Swedish Television, SVT, in conjunction with 
the euro referendum in 2003.    66
Table 6. Summary statistics (municipal data) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std  dev  Min  Max 
       
Yes  votes  (percent)  290  35.10 10.97 13.10 75.10 
Trade EMU exposure
1  290 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.27 
Export EMU exposure
1  290 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.15 
Import EMU exposure
1  290 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.14 
Difference emp pattern EMU
1  290 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Income per capita, SEK/1000  290  122.38  17.17  99.29  250.58 
University  ed  (share)  290 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.41 
Public  employment  (share)  290 0.38 0.08 0.17 0.65 
Population    290  30951  58987  2575  761721 
Population density  290  125.64  420.22  0.00  4058.00 
Welfare  (share)  290 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.12 
Foreign  born  (share)  290 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.39 
Age  0-10  (share)  290 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.17 
Age  18-30  (share)  290 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.25 
Age  65-74  (share)  290 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.15 
Age  75+  (share)  290 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.15 
Non-employed  20-64  (share)  290 0.23 0.04 0.14 0.46 
Unemployment  (share)  290 5.60 2.27 1.80  18.90 
Sick leave
  290 47.70 9.35 22.10  76.30 
1 See text for precise definitions. The data has been retrieved from Statistics Sweden, apart from data on 
unemployment which is from the Swedish Labour Market Board (AMS)and sick leave from the Swedish 
National Insurance Board (Försäkringskassan). Sick leave is an aggregation of the incidence of sick leave and 
early retirement.  
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Table 7. Correlations (municipal data) 
 Yes  Trade  Export  Import  Diffemp Inc  pc  Univ  Pubemp  Pop  Popden Welfare Abroad Age010  Age1830 Age6574 Age75 Nonemp Unemp 
                    
Trade  EMU  exposure  -0.16                   
  ( 0 . 0 1 )                    
Export  EMU  exposure -0.20  0.94                  
  ( 0 . 0 0 )   ( 0 . 0 0 )                   
Import  EMU  Exposure -0.10  0.93  0.74                 
  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.00)                 
Difference  emp  patt  -0.63  -0.01  0.01  -0.02                
  (0.00)  (0.90)  (0.92)  (0.72)                
Income  per  capita  0.73  -0.23  -0.21  -0.23  -0.48               
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)               
University  edu  0.72  -0.44  -0.43  -0.39  -0.36  0.78              
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)              
Public  employment  -0.35  -0.49  -0.43  -0.49  0.43  -0.13  0.05             
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.41)             
Population  0.34  -0.19  -0.19  -0.17  -0.19  0.29  0.47  -0.06            
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.32)            
Population  density  0.45  -0.21  -0.20  -0.19  -0.28  0.53  0.52  -0.20  0.59           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
Welfare  -0.19  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.18  -0.26  -0.15  0.10  0.29  0.04          
  (0.00) (0.43) (0.41) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.49)                 
Born  abroad  0.57 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.35 0.35 0.26 -0.27 0.35 0.42 0.22               
  (0.00) (0.42) (0.61) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
Age  0-10  0.63 -0.18 -0.20 -0.14 -0.55 0.57 0.44 -0.22 0.07 0.14 -0.29 0.27             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)             
Age  18-30  0.39 -0.18  -0.19  -0.16  -0.22 0.24 0.52 -0.06 0.58 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.11           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)           
Age  65-74  -0.66 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.63 -0.54 -0.55 0.27 -0.34 -0.33 0.11 -0.39 -0.78 -0.54         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Age  75+  -0.65 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.59 -0.57 -0.47 0.17 -0.21 -0.20 0.17 -0.42 -0.83 -0.38 0.84       
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
Non-employment  -0.17  -0.12  -0.09  -0.13 0.36 -0.26  -0.05 0.32 0.18 0.06 0.47 0.31 -0.50 0.19 0.37 0.31     
  (0.00) (0.05) (0.14) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Unemployment  -0.46 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12 0.59 -0.36 -0.28 0.46 -0.01 -0.16 0.33 -0.07 -0.55 -0.08 0.55  0.43  0.70   
  (0.00) (0.12) (0.33) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.01) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Sick  leave  -0.71 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.54 -0.53 -0.60 0.38 -0.25 -0.29 0.29 -0.22 -0.60 -0.37 0.67 0.52 0.51 0.55 
  (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Correlations. P-values in parentheses (n=290). 
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Table 8. Individual determinants of the Yes vote (probit estimates) 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
(Base category)  Probit (yes=1)  Probit (yes=1)  Probit (yes=1) 
      
Woman -0.121***  -0.0960***  -0.0966*** 
(Male) (0.0095)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Age 0.978***  1.006***  1.387*** 
(-) (0.19)  (0.32)  (0.34) 
Age
2 -0.871***  -0.968***  -1.278*** 
(-) (0.20)  (0.34)  (0.36) 
Swedish citizen  -0.116***  -0.113***  -0.0753* 
(Non-Swede) (0.035)  (0.038)  (0.040) 
Foreign parent  0.0995***  0.113***  0.137*** 
(No foreign parent)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Grew up small town  0.0265*  0.00980  0.0136 
(Grew up rural)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Grew up town  0.0957***  0.0656***  0.0435*** 
(Grew up rural)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.016) 
Grew up city  0.118***  0.0511**  0.0449** 
(Grew up rural)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.022) 
LO   -0.121***  -0.0450*** 
(Not union member)    (0.014)  (0.016) 
TCO   -0.0994***  -0.0563** 
(Not union member)    (0.024)  (0.023) 
SACO   -0.00126  0.0227 
(Not union member)    (0.021)  (0.022) 
Unemployed     -0.0837***  -0.0562** 
(Employed)   (0.025)  (0.027) 
Retired age    -0.00693  -0.0249 
(Employed)   (0.029)  (0.026) 
Retired early    -0.126***  -0.0681** 
(Employed)   (0.032)  (0.035) 
Student     0.0670***  0.0955*** 
(Employed)   (0.019)  (0.021) 
White-collar   0.204***  0.141*** 
(Blue-collar)   (0.019)  (0.023) 
Farmer     -0.0441  -0.0756 
(Blue-collar)   (0.061)  (0.071) 
Self employed    0.106***  0.101*** 
(Blue-collar)   (0.028)  (0.036) 
Entrepreneur (1-9)    0.171***  0.100*** 
(Blue-collar)   (0.029)  (0.037) 
Entrepreneur (10+)    0.203***  0.222*** 
(Blue-collar)   (0.057)  (0.060) 
Private empl    0.0881***  0.0590*** 
(Municipal empl)    (0.014)  (0.015) 
Government empl    0.0426**  0.0374* 
(Municipal empl)    (0.019)  (0.020) 
Left wing      -0.0748*** 
(Not left or right)      (0.015) 
Right wing      0.223*** 
(Not left or right)      (0.012) 
Leave EU      -0.526*** 
(Stay in EU)      (0.0098) 
      
Obs 9603  8631  8452 
Pseudo R
2  0.02 0.07 0.26 
Probit estimates (marginal effects, evaluated at sample mean, shown). The dependent variable takes the value 1 if yes. The 
following groups are used as base categories: Male, Non-Swedish citizen, No foreign parent, Grew up rural, Not member of 
trade union, Employed, Blue-collar, Employed in the municipal public sector, Neither left nor right wing, Stay in EU. The 
estimate of “Home-worker” has been suppressed due to the few observations in this group. Robust standard errors (clustered 
at municipal level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Municipal level regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Share Yes  Share Yes  Share Yes  Share Yes  Share Yes  Share Yes 
  (Total trade)  (Total trade)  (Total trade) (EMU-trade) (EMU-trade) (EMU-trade) 
        
Trade    -0.383***    -0.940***    
Exposure  (0.12)    (0.34)    
Export     -1.046***    -2.080***  
Exposure   (0.25)    (0.52)  
Import       -0.328*     -0.693 
Exposure     (0.18)     (0.62) 
Difference  in  -4.204* -3.753 -4.466* -3.897  -3.731 -4.293* 
empl  patterns  (2.47) (2.42) (2.51) (2.48) (2.44) (2.51) 
        
Income per cap  0.336  0.403**  0.259  0.322  0.387**  0.236 
(×100)  (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) 
University  3yrs  2.742**  2.578** 2.980*** 2.832**  2.631** 3.089*** 
  (1.09) (1.05) (1.13) (1.09) (1.05) (1.13) 
Public employ  -0.687***  -0.832***  -0.563** -0.741***  -0.753*** -0.602** 
  (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) 
Population  0.0904*** 0.0832*** 0.0956*** 0.0872*** 0.0852*** 0.0936*** 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) 
Pop.  dens  -0.264 -0.389* -0.188 -0.308 -0.304 -0.235 
(×10  000)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) 
Welfare  -2.267** -2.055** -2.305** -2.059** -2.016** -2.161** 
  (0.86) (0.85) (0.89) (0.86) (0.85) (0.87) 
Foreign  born   3.247*** 3.374*** 3.138*** 3.305*** 3.276*** 3.190*** 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.48) 
Age  0-10  2.114 1.814 2.348 2.066 1.624 2.425 
  (2.20) (2.10) (2.26) (2.19) (2.15) (2.25) 
Age  18-30  -4.219*** -4.070*** -4.399*** -4.271*** -4.259*** -4.418*** 
  (1.13) (1.08) (1.18) (1.12) (1.11) (1.16) 
Age  65-74  4.997** 4.849** 4.891** 5.131** 5.175** 4.837** 
  (2.31) (2.27) (2.35) (2.34) (2.32) (2.37) 
Age  75+  -2.653* -2.390* -2.659* -2.558*  -2.865**  -2.413* 
  (1.34) (1.36) (1.35) (1.36) (1.37) (1.38) 
Non-empl    1.398 1.336 1.445 1.337 1.435 1.377 
20-64  (1.15) (1.12) (1.17) (1.14) (1.13) (1.15) 
Unemployment -0.0246*  -0.0252*  -0.0232 -0.0234*  -0.0245* -0.0222 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Sick  leave  -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.109*** 
(×10)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
        
Obs  290 290 290 290 290 290 
R
2  0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 
The dependent variable is ln[yes/(1-yes)]. All regressions include 8 unreported regional dummies. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Combining individual and municipal data (probit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Probit (yes=1)  Probit (yes=1)  Probit (yes=1)  Probit (yes=1)  Probit (yes=1) 
  Comparison  Municipal   Diff empl and  Diff empl and  Diff empl and 
    dummies  trade expose  export expose  import expose 
       
Difference in      -1.943***  -1.963***  -1.892** 
empl patterns      (0.751)  (0.732)  (0.771) 
Trade       -0.327    
Exposure     (0.223)    
Export         -0.764**   
Exposure       (0.392)  
Import         -0.450 
Exposure       (0.474) 
       
LO  -0.0450***  -0.0421** -0.0433** -0.0429**  -0.0439*** 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
TCO  -0.0563** -0.0520** -0.0558** -0.0554** -0.0563** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
SACO  0.0227 0.0206 0.0212 0.0209 0.0216 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unemployed    -0.0562** -0.0609** -0.0565** -0.0563** -0.0567** 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Retired  age  -0.0249 -0.0300 -0.0282 -0.0280 -0.0283 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Retired  early  -0.0681** -0.0705** -0.0683** -0.0687**  -0.0681* 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Student    0.0955*** 0.0937*** 0.0956*** 0.0954*** 0.0959*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
White-collar  0.141*** 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Farmer    -0.0756 -0.0861 -0.0674 -0.0681 -0.0677 
  (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Self-employed 0.101***  0.0964***  0.101***  0.100***  0.102*** 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Entrepreneur    0.100***  0.105*** 0.0992***  0.0985*** 0.100*** 
(1-9)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Entrepreneur    0.222*** 0.219*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 
(10+)  (0.060) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Private  empl  0.0590*** 0.0516*** 0.0564*** 0.0562*** 0.0567*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Government  empl  0.0374* 0.0367* 0.0362* 0.0363* 0.0366* 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
       
Individ.  controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Attitudes  incl  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  8452 8452 8452 8452 8452 
Pseudo R
2  0.26 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Probit estimates (marginal effects, evaluated at sample mean, shown). The dependent variable takes the value 1 
if yes. Column (1) is included for comparison. Column (2) includes a set of 82 municipal dummies. Individual 
controls include Woman, Age, Age
2, Swedish citizen, Foreign parent, Grew up small town, Grew up town, Grew 
up city. Attitudes include Left wing, Right wing, Leave EU. The following groups are used as base categories: 
Male, Non-Swedish citizen, No foreign parent, Grew up rural, Not member of trade union, Employed, Blue-
collar, Employed in the municipal public sector, Neither left nor right wing, Stay in EU. The estimate of 
“Homeworker” has been suppressed due to the few observations in this group. Robust standard errors (clustered 
at municipal level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Interactions between individual and municipal characteristics (probit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












        
Private  empl  ×  -3.632*** -2.382*      -9.417*** -5.674* 
Difference in empl  (1.19)  (1.30)      (3.02)  (3.34) 
Government empl ×  -0.318  -0.451      -1.178  -0.969 
Difference in empl  (1.64)  (1.74)      (4.13)  (4.45) 
Entrepreneur (10+) ×  -5.032  -2.666      -13.16  -7.541 
Difference in empl  (7.22)  (8.55)      (18.1)  (22.0) 
Entrepreneur (1-9) ×  4.083  3.701      9.846  9.606 
Difference in empl  (2.92)  (2.93)      (7.46)  (7.59) 
Self employed ×  0.732  -0.319      1.633  -1.283 
Difference in empl  (2.55)  (2.64)      (6.43)  (6.74) 
White collar ×  -1.980  -2.268      -5.284  -6.231 
Difference in empl  (1.38)  (1.53)      (3.50)  (3.91) 
LO  ×  -0.997  -2.307    -2.755  -6.138 
Difference in empl  (1.48)  (1.68)      (3.76)  (4.30) 
TCO  ×  0.917 0.0385      2.452 0.0326 
Difference in empl  (1.60)  (1.77)      (4.03)  (4.52) 
SACO  ×  -2.962* -4.684**      -7.294* -11.71** 
Difference in empl  (1.69)  (1.85)      (4.25)  (4.73) 
Unemployed  ×  -1.444  -1.430    -3.751  -3.916 
Difference in empl  (2.60)  (2.72)      (6.57)  (6.97) 
Student  ×  -2.620  -3.242    -7.565  -8.910 
Difference in empl  (1.93)  (2.18)      (4.87)  (5.59) 
Private empl ×      0.404  3.040*  -0.0940  2.794 
Export  exposure      (1.57) (1.76) (1.59) (1.77) 
Government  ×      -1.558 1.386 -1.920 1.131 
Export  exposure      (2.39) (2.64) (2.40) (2.66) 
Entrepreneur  (10+)  ×      -3.222 -8.305 -2.939 -8.420 
Export  exposure      (7.99) (8.31) (7.87) (8.28) 
Entrepreneur  (1-9)  ×      -4.000 -3.139 -2.912 -1.970 
Export  exposure      (4.89) (5.03) (4.93) (5.07) 
Self employed ×      -4.058  -8.086*  -3.893  -8.271* 
Export  exposure      (4.07) (4.50) (4.08) (4.51) 
White-collar  ×      -1.527 -0.997 -1.554 -1.179 
Export  exposure      (1.90) (2.13) (1.91) (2.14) 
LO  ×      -1.984 -2.407 -2.136 -2.738 
Export  exposure      (1.91) (2.19) (1.92) (2.20) 
TCO  ×      0.511 -1.131 0.546 -1.208 
Export  exposure      (2.17) (2.40) (2.18) (2.40) 
SACO  ×      1.257 1.285 0.954 0.893 
Export  exposure      (2.59) (2.83) (2.60) (2.85) 
Unemployed  ×      -5.957*  -8.676** -6.189** -8.837** 
Export  exposure      (3.08) (3.47) (3.09) (3.48) 
Student ×      -4.324  -2.800  -4.799*  -3.313 
Export  exposure      (2.63) (3.13) (2.66) (3.18) 
        
Attitudes  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Ind cont  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Muni  dum  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  8631 8452 8631 8452 8631 8452 
Pseudo R
2  .10 .28 .10 .28 .10 .28 
Probit estimates (marginal effects, evaluated at sample mean, shown). The dependent variable takes the value 1 if yes. 
Regressions include municipal dummies. In addition to the interacted variables, individual controls include Woman, Age, 
Age
2, Swedish citizen, Foreign parent, Grew up small town, Grew up town, Grew up city. Attitudes include Left wing, Right 
wing, Leave EU. The following groups are used as base categories: Male, Non-Swedish citizen, No foreign parent, Grew up 
rural, Not member of trade union, Employed, Blue-collar, Employed in the municipal public sector, Neither left nor right 
wing, Stay in EU. The estimates of “Homeworker”-interactions have been suppressed due to the few observations in this 
group, as are interactions for the retired (early and age) and farmers. Robust standard errors (clustered at municipal level). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12a. What motives were important for different groups of voters? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Motive  The Interest Rate  The Welfare State  The Swedish Economy 
        
Yes   -0.190***  -0.061***   -0.005 
   (0.029)  (0.017)  (0.021) 
Export  exposure  0.453** 0.154  0.011 -0.103 -0.116 -0.079 
  (0.195) (0.189) (0.116) (0.131) (0.110) (0.133) 
Export exposure ×    0.248    0.189    -0.029 
Yes   (0.349)  (0.167)  (0.189) 
Difference in   0.681**  0.342  -0.636***  -1.232***  -0.712**  -0.675 
empl  patterns  (0.294) (0.388) (0.231) (0.304) (0.353) (0.444) 
Diff empl patterns    -0.369    1.026***    -0.004 
×  Yes   (0.813)  (0.347)  (0.427) 
Private  empl  0.009  0.042***  -0.001 0.008 0.012 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Private empl ×    -0.051***    -0.015    0.016 
Yes   (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Government  empl    0.001 0.018 -0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.004 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
Government  empl     -0.021  -0.003  0.013 
×  Yes   (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.014) 
Self-employed  -0.032 0.036 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005  -0.036* 
  (0.021) (0.030) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) 
Self-employed ×    -0.116***    0.015    0.058** 
Yes   (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.027) 
Entrepreneur (1-9)  -0.059***  0.007  -0.017  -0.040*  0.018  -0.013 
  (0.020) (0.024) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.019) 
Entrepreneur (1-9)     -0.104***    0.044    0.055)* 
×  Yes   (0.039)  (0.028)  (0.028 
Entrepreneur  (10+)  -0.082**  -0.087*  0.042 0.011 0.020 0.027 
  (0.035) (0.052) (0.032) (0.060) (0.036) (0.066) 
Entrepreneur  (10+)    0.037  0.061  -0.009 
×  Yes   (0.076)  (0.069)  (0.067) 
White-collar -0.027***  0.043***  -0.004  0.000  0.028***  0.023** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) 
White-collar  ×    -0.095***   0.005  0.011 
Yes   (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
LO  0.014* -0.003  -0.018**  -0.015 -0.007 -0.004 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) 
LO × Yes    0.026    -0.006    -0.008 
   (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
TCO 0.031***  0.007  0.005  0.010  -0.010  -0.014 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) 
TCO × Yes    0.012    -0.014    0.009 
   (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.020) 
SACO 0.001  0.042**  -0.005  0.026**  0.001  -0.008 
  (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) 
SACO  ×  Yes   -0.066***  -0.051***   0.015 
   (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.023) 
Unemployed    0.014  -0.023  -0.018 -0.031** -0.026  -0.029 
  (0.013)  (0.015) (0.010)* (0.013)  (0.011)**  (0.012)** 
Unemployed × Yes    0.058**    0.030    0.009 
   (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.024) 
Student -0.014  0.025  0.009  0.005  -0.006  -0.016 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Student × Yes    -0.065***    0.014    0.023 
   (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
        
Attitudes  included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  7272 7272 7272 7272 7272 7272 
R
2  0.10 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 
OLS-regressions. The dependent variable is the answer to the weight placed by the respondent on the respective motivational questions, 
normalized by the average of the answer to all motivational questions. Individual controls include Woman, Age, Age
2, Swedish citizen, 
Foreign parent, Grew up small town, Grew up town, Grew up city. Attitudes include Left wing, Right wing, Leave EU. The direct and 
interaction effects for farmers, retired (early and age) and home-workers have been suppressed to save space. The following groups are used 
as base categories: Male, Non-Swedish citizen, No foreign parent, Grew up rural, Not member of trade union, Employed, Blue-collar, 
Employed in the municipal public sector, Neither left nor right wing, Stay in EU. Robust standard errors (clustered at municipal level). *** 
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Table 12b. What motives were important for different groups of voters? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Motive  Private economy  National independence  Influence the EU  Gender equality 
          
Yes   -0.011    -0.190***    0.240***    -0.044* 
   (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.030)   (0.022) 
Export exposure  0.455***  0.544***  0.300**  -0.090  -0.528**  -0.202  0.219  0.078 
  (0.143) (0.179) (0.132) (0.141) (0.227) (0.261)  (0.142) (0.189) 
Export exposure     -0.160    0.493**    -0.384    0.299 
×  Yes   (0.191)  (0.241)  (0.346)   (0.199) 
Difference in   0.491  0.736  1.103***  0.707**  -0.827*  -0.313  0.882**  0.708 
empl  patterns  (0.384) (0.490) (0.309) (0.303) (0.449) (0.423)  (0.361) (0.570) 
Diff  empl     -0.410  -0.007  -0.191   0.280 
patterns  ×  Yes   (0.454)  (0.446)  (0.659)   (0.559) 
Private empl  0.002  -0.001  -0.009  0.016*  0.007  -0.024**  -0.021***  -0.028*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.009) 
Private empl ×    0.004    -0.032***    0.047***    0.019 
Yes   (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.015)   (0.012) 
Government    -0.005 -0.014 -0.014 0.004 0.020* 0.016  -0.018*  -0.026* 
Emp  (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.015) 
Government     0.014  -0.021  -0.002   0.020 
Emp  ×Yes   (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.024)   (0.018) 
Self-employed -0.060***  -0.052**  -0.028 0.002 0.013 -0.014  -0.018 0.001 
  (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.016) (0.024)  (0.016) (0.023) 
Self-employed     -0.006  -0.046  0.025   -0.033 
×  Yes   (0.026)  (0.040)  (0.032)   (0.033) 
Entrepreneur    -0.037***  -0.073***  -0.031 0.010 0.017 0.047  0.012 0.006 
(1-9)  (0.014) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.029)  (0.014) (0.026) 
Entrepreneur     0.074**  -0.062**  -0.077**   0.007 
(1-9)  ×  Yes   (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.034)   (0.036) 
Entrepreneur    -0.093***  -0.084 -0.092** -0.036 0.092**  0.075  -0.039  -0.073 
(10+)  (0.030) (0.058) (0.039) (0.065) (0.037) (0.089)  (0.027) (0.045) 
Entrepreneur     -0.000  -0.063  -0.028   0.055 
(10+)  ×  Yes   (0.072)  (0.086)  (0.106)   (0.069) 
White-collar  -0.062*** -0.081*** -0.031***  0.019  0.056***  0.026* -0.035*** -0.031** 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.012) 
White-collar ×    0.043***    -0.062***    0.008    -0.006 
Yes   (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.016)   (0.020) 
LO  0.028***  0.022* -0.003 -0.025* -0.009  0.019  0.013  0.002 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.011) 
LO × Yes    0.013    0.035    -0.054***    0.029 
   (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.019)   (0.018) 
TCO  0.010 -0.003  0.026**  -0.001 -0.015 0.006   -0.002 
  (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013)  0.010  (0.015) 
TCO × Yes    0.028    0.024    -0.014  (0.008)  0.023 
   (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.019)   (0.020) 
SACO  -0.040***  -0.063***  -0.003 -0.000  0.039***  0.024  -0.020 -0.006 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.016)  (0.009)**  (0.020) 
SACO  ×  Yes   0.039  -0.003  0.023   -0.023 
   (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.025)   (0.028) 
Unemployed    0.005 0.021 0.016 -0.006  -0.007 0.018  0.035 0.039*** 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)  (0.014)**  (0.014) 
Unemployed     -0.043*   0.023    -0.029    -0.015 
×  Yes   (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.026)   (0.031) 
Student -0.055***  -0.073***  -0.020*  0.030**  0.055***  0.048***  -0.011  -0.002 
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.017) 
Student × Yes    0.048***    -0.090***    -0.016    -0.019 
   (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.020)   (0.021) 
          
Attitudes  incl  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  contr Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  7272 7272 7272 7272 7272 7272 7272 7272 
R
2  0.05 0.06 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.26 0.09 0.10 
 
OLS-regressions. The dependent variable is the answer to the weight placed by the respondent on the respective motivational questions, 
normalized by the average of the answer to all motivational questions. Individual controls include Woman, Age, Age
2, Swedish citizen, 
Foreign parent, Grew up small town, Grew up town, Grew up city. Attitudes include Left wing, Right wing, Leave EU. The direct and 
interaction effects for farmers, retired (early and age) and home-workers are suppressed to save space. The following groups are used as base 
categories: Male, Non-Swedish citizen, No foreign parent, Grew up rural, Not member of trade union, Employed, Blue-collar, Employed in 
the municipal public sector, Neither left nor right wing, Stay in EU. Robust standard errors (clustered at municipal level). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Source: Holmberg (2003). 
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Chart 4. Scatter diagram of share of No-votes and paid absence from the labour market. 
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Source: Data supplied by Jan Edling, LO, Stockholm.   78
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